Gonna rant, gonna philosophy, so just bear with me.
I had a revelation about a year ago that I've been chewing ever since. Shit is brewing in this country. We all know it. Many of us can articulate it. Some of us are trying to change it. Some don't give a fuck. Whatever your stance, you're probably cognizant that today's USA is really fucking far from what the founders intended. We're not some habitually oppressed third world shithole ruled by a communist dictator, where every day life is a living hell. By the standards of the world around us, America still has it pretty fucking good.
Unless you're a Marine in Arizona.
Or that chick from the town council meeting.
Or you're on the SPLC's "hatewatch" list.
Or you want to board a flight while retaining your sperm viability AND anal virginity.
Or you want your own health insurance, or none at all.
The hard truth to say out loud is that Americans are being oppressed. We're not being oppressed very much. But it has started, it is present, it is widespread, and there are systems and laws being made and precedents being set and doors being opened that are pulling the road in front of us down into a slippery slope.
The little atrocity happens. The public is outraged. The associates of the people responsible call for calm. The people grumble for a while. A lawsuit get filed. Some job titles are shuffled around, or an investigation concludes nothing. The event is dismissed. The people simmer a bit, but soon forget.
Most of the people, anyway. Every time something like that happens, there is someone who remembers it. And each time another person gets one of these myriad acts stuck in their craw, the cold war snowballs a little.
That man who saw the fires at Waco burning and picked up a weapon was laughed at. Laughed at by the man who watched Ruby Ridge unfolding and picked up a weapon to join him. Who in turn was laughed at by the man who watched David Olofson taken to prison and dusted off his rifle. Who was laughed at by the man who later heard about a Marine and a father, murdered by police, and who continued the cycle. More recently, passage of the NDAA law and an entire new generation of espionage technologies being tested against the public are causing a further growth in this attitude. A cycle that goes on even as this is being written, and one that grows ever larger and more encompassing by the day and by the year.
"Fuck Your Shit"s and "Deal With It"s
There are two crowds in this country. The "Fuck your shits" and the "Deal with its." The FYS are the ones getting ready for war. They've been getting ready at some level or another since the 50s and 60s when the first threat was the internal Communist movements. They don't march down main street in camouflage. They go into their local gun shop and buy an AR-15, an optical sight, a couple cases of ammunition, and a dozen spare magazines and when I ask them why, they tell me "Just in case." Thousands of them. All in one little town in one little corner of the United States. How many are in the nation? By a conservative reckoning, millions.
The "Deal with its" are a different beast. Some call them "prags" or pragmatists. They're of the mind that these acts of oppression are excusable because they are relatively small in scope, and impersonal in impact. Their attitude is that it is the responsibility of the public to "deal with it" when they are abused, because the system is still good enough overall or in their particular area of life that they don't want it fundamentally shaken or changed. They are individually more or less willing to tolerate being a victim of that abuse, justifying it as not to be hypocritical when they tell others to submit. They believe that the problem should be dealt with after the fact - by inquiries and lawsuits and litigation after the victim has already suffered. Or by their next of kin, if they didn't suffer long. A fine outcome for the integrity of the system and the "rule of law" but not so good for the man gunned down in his home. What about him? What about me? What about you? Any of us are different how, exactly? The answer is that we are not. This is not a subjective viewpoint.
Every time one of these little atrocities happens, the whole body of the public is forced to choose whether to deal with it, or start telling the people responsible something about fornicating their feces. The difference between the two views, however, is that the FYS crowd never shrinks.
When a person's morals and reason are outraged to an extent that that they are, despite remaining lawful in action, willing to consciously accept the idea of resistance, it is an indicator that the paradigm of society is changing. To accept the idea that armed resistance is legitimate under the right circumstances, even against one's own government, and to back that acknowledgment up with the acquisition of weaponry and training, is to shift to a different level of thinking. Once this is acknowledged, there is no going back. The FYS will forever be an FYS, and will never again be a DWI pragmatist. They have drawn their line in the sand somewhere. They keep quiet, following the laws they believe in and waiting for that line to be crossed. And hoping that others have set the same line, so that they might not be alone if they must act.
It is this paradigm that the modern militia movement emerges from.
The idea of the militia is simple. You don't need an army to defend a nation if every village defends itself. "If all your pennies are in order, your dollars take care of themselves." A militia is a small scale, decentralized military force of non-professional soldiers. If you need military force, but all you have is some friends and some guns and a little bit of knowledge, what you have is a militia. When communications are so widespread that militias everywhere are connected through the internet, and express certain shared beliefs and actively recruit new members, what you have is the American Militia Movement.
And somehow it has all gone wrong. I know what that somehow is, and it's gnawing at my insides to put words to paper and describe it.
The first question to be answered is, what constitutes the militia movement?
The second is, what are its goals?
The third, and biggest, is what is it lacking?
And finally, can it even be fixed? And if so, how?
If the militia movement as I described above doesn't apply to the modern American reality of the movement, then just what the hell do we actually have?
The short answer is a god damned mess.
The militia as it exists today is a rusty gun being used to hammer nails. It is a viable force, but so lacking in direction and purpose that it is rotting from the inside out due to disuse. Go to AWRM.org and look through their topics in the various forums and mentally catalog what you see. These people are soundly representative of the whole movement in it's current sorry state.
First you have the religious zealots. The People who Strangely Capitalize words that Don't Need to be Capitalized. They produce serious arguments that the government is in the control of satanic forces, and that someone or other is the Antichrist. Their interest in abuses of law extends only as far as it satisfies their justification for a holy war against enemies of their ubiquitously Christian faith. They are muslim jihadists in every sense of the word.
Next most prevalent are the agitators. They appear in every thread detailing some little oppression and rant and rave that nobody is acting on it. They throw obnoxiously childish words like "sheeple" around and express utter disdain for the very public in whose interest they would claim the authority to act. They chomp at the bit for the first shots to be fired. These people are stupid dogs, straining at the end of their chain and roaring at the passing car they want to chase, not giving a moments thought to what they would actually do with it if they could give chase and somehow caught it. At least a percentage of these are unfriendly intelligence assets.
Finally you have the soapbox speakers. They stand up and write posts, not unlike this one, giving overviews of the situation and encouraging people to do something or think somesuch. They fancy themselves motivators or leaders, but they rarely say anything more concretely useful than "down with tyranny" and often fall upon deaf ears entirely.
There is no intellectual discussion, no deep thinking, no philosophy beyond parroting the words of our founders, and frankly I doubt the whole lot of them has two brain cells between them. They are pathetic, and as a consequence so is the movement they represent.
So lacking is the movement for direction that they will accept input from any member of the fringe who opposes the government. If not for the directly opposing religious dogmas of christians and muslims, it is likely that jihadis would even have a place at their table.
The militia movement, in short, is actually constituted by any idiot who doesn't like the government, identifies with certain beliefs of the founders, accepts the use of violence as legitimate, and can tolerate the rantings of christian theocrats. Half of them have poor spelling and grammar, and resort to BOLDED CAPSLOCK to try and get attention drawn to their infinitely redundant, pedantic points of discussion.
Low intelligence, lack of forethought, toleration of fundamentalism, and armed militancy. This is a bad combination of factors, and it's no wonder they scare the government shitless with the risk of lone wolf terrorists spawning in their midst.
The chief problem with the militia movement is that it has no broad cohesion in its goals. Aside from a general feeling of anger and a desire for change at the fundamental levels of government, they have nothing figured out. Like an inexperienced worker trying to imagine what his job will be like, their mental simulations of the realities of their desired shooting war are woefully inaccurate. But they seem to find more satisfaction in the mental masturbation of being freedom fighters, talking tough, and seeing themselves as heroes than in doing the actual dirty work of thinking their way through.. Simply put, they're too busy dreaming about the island they're sailing to, to figure out how to actually sail the boat.
Why this is the case is a question with a multi-part answer. The first part is that the militia movement is decentralized. You don't need to have a cohesive goal if you can always split off and form your own faction. this means that the goals of the individuals become paramount over the group, and so the identity of the movement becomes somewhat schizophrenic, as it is seen publicly to espouse all of the stated goals of the individual factions. The desire by one group for christian dominance is placed on equal footing with another's desire to return to the gold standard, is equal to another's to put liberals into concentration camps is equal to another's to impeach Barack Obama. The result is such a convoluted mess of competing and complimentary ideologies that the mental state of the movement, taken as a whole, is quite literally insane.
The second part of the problem stems from the above. That these divergent thought processes and independent nature prohibit effective cooperation between factions. This lack of cooperation and cohesion then comes full circle, making the initial problem worse because it prohibits the building of a dominant ideology: One that could suppress the more destructive lesser ideologies and clarify the militia's identity, bringing the movement to bear with purpose.
Nothing less than some form of broad, national structure could establish such a dominant ideology. Yet this very concept is anathema to the militia movement. In many cases, it is precisely the rejection of the traditional military command structure that steers the militant-minded individual away from the traditional military and towards the militia. Yet, in my opinion, there are ways that this could be accomplished without sacrificing the pseudoindependent nature of the militia system.
What The Militia Is & Isn'tEdit
What is needed next is not a look at what the militia is, but rather what it is not.
What the militia is not is also a wide subject. The best view is to look at the militia as a microcosm of the more ordinary military force of a nation. The individual militia typically does for the town, province, or county what the standing army does for the country as a whole.
Yet, looking at this picture there is a glaring difference. The standing army does not operate in a vacuum. The nation exists as a unified whole comprised of several parts, each interconnected and interdependent.
The military is only one branch of this whole. It has the responsibility of enforcing the laws of the civil government in times of severe crisis and preventing interference from force used by external entities. It requires a civil government to control it, raise tax revenue to fund it, provide political justification for it's continued existence, and perform nonmilitary duties.
The military exists only as a subordinate to the civil power, which itself is subordinate to the votes of the people electorate. The civil power, in turn, gives commands to the military which must be in line with the interests of the people. The military is thus indirectly subordinate to the public, and this provides accountability and instills a desire for cohesiveness and good behavior. A traditional military is further divided by an officer corps, who is more tightly linked politically to the civil power than those below them, and who also exorcise the most power over the combat forces. This system creates a reasonably tight interconnection between the will of the public and the direct action of the military. The people vote as they will, those elected are beholden to the views that got them elected, and those views are translated into political decisions which provide the military both it's funding and it's various mandates. The militia movement has no such force providing it direction.
Even the most public militia has only as much public input as it's own members provide, and are run more substantially like a semiprivate club or association than a true military force. It's enrollment may be open to the general public, but it's command echelon is almost universally decided by the eldest members, or those with the most practical military experience. While potentially useful at a tactical level, this denies the militia two of the most fundamental needs of any legitimate military organization: A legitimate mandate for action, and the influence of the public will in their decision making process. This latter absence is the most detrimental of the two, because it means that the individual militia will only act according to the will of those who directly command it. This means that such a militia remains a private military force. Without the brush of a political mechanism to paint the militia's motivations with the colors of the people's will, the militia and it's leaders are little more than private army led by warlords. Good intentions towards the people do not take the place of obedience to their will.
In short, the primary weakness of the militia movement as seen in America is it's attempt to encompass all the parts of the organized military, including it's civil responsibilities, within the confines of a logistically-limited, entirely military entity. Even at a glance, this is obviously unworkable.
The militia movement fails to limit it's scope to the military purposes it is suited to. With so many independent factions conflicting these myriad interpretations of purpose come crashing together like a train wreck. This is the linchpin of the militia movement's failure: They have only a hammer, and see the world and their problems with it as a sea of nails.
More tools are needed to deal with the challenges the militia movement faces, and the greatest of these are purpose and legitimacy. Both of these can be provided by creating a political connection to the public, and the first step to successfully accomplishing this is for the militia movement to realize that, in it's current state, it is most seriously unwanted by the American public at large. The very word "militia" is now a public relations death sentence. In order to escape the stigma of the past, the militia movement must embrace and swallow a very bitter pill: The psychological medicine of politics and public relations.
The very name "militia" may need to be discarded. The militia movement must present itself to the public in a form, however insubstantial to it's purpose, that meets the political approval of the people. It is only then that the public mind may be opened to consider their legitimacy. A name is a factory that creates and constructs an image in the mind of the one who hears it, attaching to it any number of implicit and explicit attributes. Like it or not, fair or not, reasonable or not, the name militia has been translated into the public mind to generate the image of uncontrolled militancy, violence, disregard for the norms of law and order, and even domestic terrorism. These trends are not easily reversed, and the pride of those partaking in the movement is not sufficient justification for the denial of a more expedient path to remediation. This is especially true if the American situation is becoming as rapidly dire as many in the movement profess. The militia may be prideful of it's heritage, but it must do so under a new, publicly and politically acceptable identity.
Changing the name is the first step in remastering the public identity of the militia movement. The second step is likely to be the most difficult, and can be accomplished in one of two ways.
The goal of the movement must be to establish it's identity in the minds of the local populace wherein that particular militia operates. They must establish the political connection to the public that is so sorely lacking under the current manifestation of the movement. There are two potential ways this can be accomplished. The first is by co-opting the existing political system. The individual militia group must establish contact with the governing administrations in their local municipality. Potentially sympathetic conservative party members should be targeted, and no mention of military capacity should be made. This approach has been tried by conventional militia groups in the past, and rightly rebuffed. When some napoleonic simpleton swaggers into a congressman's or mayor's office and tells him that his private militia may be at his service in the event of Federal government interference, it does not take much to discern what the reaction of a family man and career politician should be. If, on the other hand, an organization called the "Association of Civil Assistance Providers", or “City Volunteer Guard” sent a professionally crafted information packet offering search-and-rescue assistance to the local sheriff and fire departments, and perhaps sent a representative to speak to the City Council, a much more sympathetic light can be cast.
The second option is to contact the public directly, through the formation of neighborhood committees. This effort mimics much of the mechanics utilized by so called "community organizers" and effectively creates a neighborhood-scale public relations and media wing within the militia. It should conduct non-intrusive polling of public opinion and solicit donations of funds. The militia can form it's own mandate, and it's own goals, by determining what the members of the community consider necessary and that is not being adequately administered by the local authorities. By soliciting donations and engaging such project themselves, they build trust in the community - intervening on the public's behalf in areas where they are dissatisfied with the current administration.
The aid rendered to the community by the militia must take public and productive forms. For instance, if a city has large residential populations stationed below a dam, the organization could pledge to aid with any disaster relief in those areas in the event of a dam failure or accident. Detailed plans should be drawn up and expressed to the community via one of the above outlets. The militia must conduct public drills to show their dedication, eschewing their military appearance in the process to avoid alarming residents. In short, the military character of the militia must be pushed to the "back burner" in favor of more immediate community desires. When the public sees results, trust is built. The trust of the public is an essential key to their meaningful input, and their willingness to give the militia the benefit of the doubt should a more hazardous political situation arise. This is the golden key to justification of armed defense. The public must trust that their defenders are right, and are acting more in their best interest than the ruling authorities.
Such public works projects constitute two important things for the purposes of the militia. Firstly, they provide the militia itself with a series of short-term goals. working toward these goals provides the opportunity to build cohesion, both within the particular militia and between the various national factions of the movement. Providing a concrete, day-to-day purpose which envelops the movement will create a baseline organizational structure. Each militia will specialize in the concerns of their particular area of operations, and this provides the justification for cross-training between different militia groups. If one specializes in search and rescue, another in firefighting assistance, and a third in flood relief, there is no reason to expect public or media backlash if these groups should opt to meet and train together. If paramilitary training is subtly incorporated into such activities, and the cover is sufficiently strong and believable, funding may even be made available through various public sources or grants. This would serve the purpose of the militia well.
The publicly acceptable identity of the militia is chiefly a cover for it's militant activities. While the long term goals of the militia must remain oriented to their military opposition to government oppression and tyranny, these activities provide it suitable cover to build and grow it's civil power network and increase it's level of influence with the public, while also keeping it's members busy with productive work, setting a baseline of publicly acceptable behavior that will root out agitators and troublemakers, and building a loose sense of structure into the movement as a whole.
The foundation of a building is necessarily crude, and by itself accomplishes nothing. however, it remains the essential base of support which is required to build upon. The militia movement as it presently exists is a sprawling apartment complex, with crooked hallways and collapsing walls, because it does not have a stable and self-sustaining foundation to support it. It is essential that such a system be constructed. If not prior to military considerations, then concurrently with them.
Once the necessary goal of building this foundation of public trust has been met, only then should serious effort be put into the military capacity of the individual militia. At this stage, the militias as individual factions as well as the movement as a whole must have incorporated certain key features. These features include:
- Amicable contacts within the local authorities.
- The respect of the public in their area of operations (AO)
- An internal system of public relations.
- A strong sense of the public's opinion on militarily relevant political and economic topics as they affect their AO.
Internal policing, rooting out agitators and troublemakers, those with criminal background, and persons who are harmfully vocal with politically incorrect opinions in public.
- A system to secure regular funding from sources both public and private.
- An extensive library of educational training materials and documents.
- A communications mechanism to contact the public at large, like a newsletter or emailing list.
Once these elements are cemented in place, you have the basic internal and external structure required to support a militant organization.
Good relations with local authorities and the public can be translated into actionable intelligence in a time of crisis. A public relations section that is well received by the public can become, with only a little effort, an effective propaganda tool. Knowing the public opinion in your area gives insight as to what the people will want the militia to do, given a particular set of circumstances. This provides purpose and direction. Eliminating the agitators, vocal racists, and those too far into the extremes of political incorrectness will reduce the internal tensions of the movement.
This allows the larger "clean" factions to more easily coordinate and cooperate while the troublemakers, who will invariably split to form their own factions where their views are welcome, will be weakened by the same lack of coordination and infighting that required their removal from the primary.
This renders them ideologically suppressible, and their destructive input will fall by the wayside in favor of the more moderate, results-oriented militant ideology that the new militia must possess.
To answer the question of "Can the Militia be fixed?" I present a comparison to the work of a small business. Specifically, how does a business start, grow, prosper, and die?
For a business to start, there must be a need or desire for that business in the community. It must have a market for what it is selling. If there is no market, a prospective business may try to create one by engaging in public relations with the community. It advertises itself, and tells the otherwise disinterested public why they should welcome it, patronize it, and help it grow. It does this not by demanding that the public accept it, boasting wildly about it's business capabilities or other such bullshit. It simply must answer the rhetorical question ever in the public mind.
"What's in it for me?"
The Militia movement is selling something too: It must sell it's own existence.
Once a market has been found or created, the business must establish itself and it must grow. It must do things that catch and keep the publics attention. It must actively compete with other entities performing the same services or offering the same goods. It must find or create nuances in the way it does business that meet with approval in the public eye.
And it must never, NEVER make the mistake of trying to grow INTO it's business. This distinction is important, because it is one of the worst organizational mistakes that the current militia movement is fond of.
To illustrate the mistake, you may picture a small commodities shop. They deal in sporting goods, and have just gotten started in the community. Their back room is is only half full and their shelves are fairly stocked. Sales are mild to moderate, but the business is making a little money. The owner wants to grow his business, and this is where he makes his mistake. Rather than increasing the substance of his business - the quality and variety of product he is actually selling and that is making him money, he instead invests in the trappings of a larger business. He gives up his leased suite for a 25000 square foot store front. He spends thousands on advertising campaigns and television commercials. Overnight he has blown his business up to huge proportions.
And it likely fails within a year. The business didn't yet have the substance to warrant such an expansion, the investments will not be recouped from increased sales fast enough to meet his new obligations, and his business is sunk.
This is the key military failure of the militia movement. Always they strive to have the trappings of a genuine military force. They buy camouflage uniforms, tactical gear, knives, bayonets, assault weapons, sniper rifles, and crates of ammunition. Then they get ambitious and try to acquire "real" military hardware: Explosives, grenades, illegal full-autos, and they get caught and go to prison. Their "business" is sunk.
The business or the militia must only grow in direct response, and in direct proportion to the public need. If the militia wants to grow, it must work to create that need. It must work to increase the demand for its presence. To sell itself to the community. It must compete with the publics expectations of them - always surpassing and impressing. It is not when the militia wants to grow that it can successfully do so, but when the people want the militia to grow.
Now that the structure of the new movement has been somewhat articulated, we may move on to the structure of the particular militias that compose it. Note that there are many hundreds of subtle nuances in the issue of the movement and the application of the observations recorded here that will play a part. I do not engage them only because they will be both unpredictable, and heavily dependent on future national politics and subjective opinions of the populous across a vast spectrum of operational areas. They cannot be predicted, and so I offer only general counsel that they be "expected."
I have made much in earlier sections about the failures of the militia movement as it stands, and I gave special attention to the fact that they attempt to make political stances from a standpoint of armed militancy - to be both legislative body and enforcer. To avoid confusion it would be useful to describe how the system this topic envisions is different in structure.
First we must draw a distinction between the Militia Movement, and the actual Militia. Definitions have been alluded to already, but to refresh: The Militia Movement is the collective identity of all Americans who are disenfranchised with the Federal government, and who have chosen to prepare for an ideological confrontation with it that will likely result in military confrontation.
The actual Militia itself is the armed paramilitary wing of this organization, which engages in the enforcement of the public will, and in the prevention of unwanted or unlawful interference from external entities to their area of operations.
The Trinity of Responsibility: Public Relations, Civil Power, MilitiaEdit
Under the new system, the Militia Movement becomes a trinity of responsibility, in contrast to the previous focus upon only the military execution of it's role. I will use specific examples to illustrate. First, the trinity itself:
- Public Relations
- Civil Power
The Public Relations wing is the first component of the movement to be established in a given area. It's job it to get a hold of the community, learn about it's problems and grievances with the local authorities, and determine what the unmet needs and desires of the community are. It is the temperature gauge for the town or county. It is the geiger counter that will register a mark where ever there is a "hot spot" that the movement could exploit to ingratiate itself to the public. In practical operation, this component requires nothing more than a few individuals with decent people skills, computers, printers, questionnaires, and brochures. It's responsibility is to gauge the area for "fertility" and to start building a rapport with the ordinary citizens. This wing both elects the members of, and reports it's findings directly to the Civil Power.
The Civil Power is the political wing of the militia movement in the particular area. It is and must remain a nonpartisan, politically active committee. The committee members are elected by the members of the Public Relations wing. The purpose of the Civil Power wing is to involve itself in local political affairs. It will make contacts with the local authorities, government offices, and emergency services and establish a rapport with potentially sympathetic members. This committee is the figurehead of the movement in the particular area of operations. They are responsible for making the day to day decisions concerning the group's resources, available work on short term goals, budgeting, political negotiation, and internal discipline. They are the center of intelligence gathering, receiving both available information from their sources within the authorities, but also information provided by the public through the Public Relations wing. It is an elected body, and it's members are chosen from the ranks of the movement by the wing that is most directly in contact with the opinions and will of the public. They are responsible for activating the actual Militia.
The final wing is the Militia itself. It is the responsibility of the Militia to accept the mandates handed down to it from the Civil Power wing. It does not concern itself with politics. It is a dedicated, small-scale fighting force with four specific responsibilities.
It must be entirely lawful and discreet in it's military character, as to not draw negative attention to the movement.
It must maintain practical levels of physical fitness, as well as sufficient training, arms and ammunition of a lawful character overseen by each member as an individual.
It must occupy itself with public works handed down by the Civil Power, but be prepared to expand, rapidly and at a moment's notice at the first signs of local military conflict.
It must dutifully obey the Military decisions made by the Civil Power, as long as they represent the will of the people in their area of operations.
It is actually the third requirement which is the most important. The new Militia is not a standing military force in the traditional sense. It can not likely justify the existence of a permanent military component that would be sufficiently large, by itself, to successfully challenge the power of the opposition. Until actually required to give battle, it will remain a small group likely not exceeding a dozen or two members at any given time. The trick then, is to maximize their ability to multiply force. The lesson to be learned in this comes from the United State's own Army Special Forces.
The purpose of the USASF was rarely to go into a conflict zone and perform direct action missions. Instead, their primary aim was to establish a militant cause within the region, and then to recruit, train, advise, and occasionally lead the local inhabitants actually fighting the battle. A small contingent of trained men could raise a large militant force quite quickly, if the political situation in the area lent them the people's ear. This is the true military objective of the Militia Movement: To establish a core force of trained militiamen who can quickly and effectively recruit, train, and help supply a large volunteer force of men taken directly from the affected population. This is the key to real military power. Not MOLLE webbing and Multicam.
If the socio-political and economic situation of an area becomes bad enough, and if those militant-minded "FYS" people are feeling their lines are being crossed, and the public is sufficiently dissatisfied with their local authorities, there will be a public desire for organization. The people will WANT an organization capable of resisting this oppression, and they will start looking. The Militia can then make it's true presence known.
It can establish a propaganda campaign and quickly gather recruits and intelligence via it's PR wing. These recruits are trained rapidly by the Militia wing who has been preparing for such a purpose, while the Civil Power wing prepares logistically and attempts to negotiate the situation in the public eye. By the time such negotiations have failed, or the external entities responsible for the situation have resorted to military force first, the Militia will have expanded in size and capability to a full-fledged, if inexperienced, fighting force. Due to their retainment of the public trust they will not be seen as interlopers or criminals as the current militia would, but as a force willing to risk itself for the people of the area. Because of this, the public will be much more amicable about keeping secret the movements, members, and actions of the Militia. They can provide useful intelligence about the movements and numbers of opposing forces, as well as provide donations of weapons, money, ammunition, and other logistical concerns.
It is this sympathetic public which is the shroud under which the Militia may then, and only then, expand it's capabilities beyond the normal limitations of the law. When it is the publics collective decision that the Militia protecting them should be allowed to have more effective tools like explosives, anti-tank weapons or automatic firearms, then the Militia may procure such armaments in relative safety. They will suffer much less risk of consequences, because the public and sympathetic authorities may turn a blind eye, in the name of emergency, to the illegality of such capabilities. The Militia has established itself as a legitimate protector of the community, and the public wants their protector to have the best tools available to confront the threat they face.
The need arises. The Militia grows. When the need exceeds their capabilities, the public allows them more. When public negotiations fail, the Militia moves. When the public is threatened, the Militia acts in their defense. When the opposing entity attacks with military force, the Militia counterattacks. When it achieves momentum, the Militia advances. When political negotiation succeeds, the Militia withdraws. When peace is re-established in the eye of the public, the Militia shrinks in proportion to the reduced need. If they are no longer needed, all but the core of the movement disbands. This is the battle philosophy the new Militia must have.
Praxis - On the Nature of Small Scale Combined Arms BattleEdit
In addition to the political and organizational failings of today's militia movement, there are military failings as well. In particular it is a heavy reliance on the doctrine of civil war via guerrilla warfare.
Guerrilla warfare has been historically proven effective in the case of resisting foreign occupation of territory. There are volumes written on the subject of how and why guerrilla war works, and the viewpoint that makes the most sense from the American perspective could be termed the "psychological victory." The classic Sun Tzu strategy of breaking the enemy's will to fight is most prevalent. The guerrilla force applies the method of death by a thousand cuts until the occupier becomes financially or politically exhausted and goes home of his own free will.
There are many historical examples of this, including most recently the Ruso-Afghan war and the Vietnam War, and potentially including the US-Iraq and US-Afghan wars, depending upon future events. The larger power, though far from militarily defeated, withdraws due to pressure from within the government, civil population, or the international community thus ending the conflict in the guerrilla's favor. From the guerrilla liberator's point of view, there is no functional difference between an enemy destroyed in battle and one that has left the land and will not be returning. Victory is achieved in either case.
This model is not applicable to any Civil War Plan for the United States that intends on keeping the nation intact. It may only be applied in a conflict scenario that involves a territorial breakup of the United states. The enemy can not be driven out by guerrilla pressure and forced to go "home" if the very home he would go back to is the same land the guerrilla is fighting for. A civil conflict that does not involve a national partitioning deprives the guerrilla of one if his greatest strengths - the home field advantage, by granting the same advantage to his opponent. This equalizes the advantages in morale, infrastructure, and terrain that are normally reserved for the guerrilla force. Without these traditional advantages, a guerrilla campaign is very unlikely to succeed.
Thus the Militia Movement must choose one of two Civil War Plans for the United States.
To establish breakaway sections of the nation, which the Militia may ideologically purge of resistance and then rally to and defend from recapture by the means of traditional guerrilla tactics. Call it "staking a claim."
The creation of a combined arms strategy that is directed to defeat the opposition en masse militarily and politically by use of traditional and special military and political operations, and aims to conquer the nation intact. Call it "the militant coup."
One of these actions is primarily defensive in nature, and the other primarily offensive. Each has special requirements that must be met, as well as distinct advantages and disadvantages.
Addressing the issue of "staking a claim."
This is currently the default strategy being employed by the present militia movement. Or at least by those intelligent enough to have any kind of strategy at all. It is much easier to rally ideological support for the idea of a group of people defending their specific homes, neighborhoods, and towns from outside threat. However, I have serious doubts that many, if any of these groups have logically extrapolated this strategy to it's ultimate conclusion. Many militias are not quiet about their desire to purge their home areas of politically opposing dissent when the shooting war becomes real. This step is arguably necessary to prevent hostile forces from exploiting this dissent and waging a counter-revolution from within the populace of the militia's own support base - a likely fatal outcome for the movement. Yet this path presents several hazards.
Under the present system, the end result is not terribly difficult to predict. If each militia successfully dominates it's particular area of operations militarily and ideologically, they may well achieve some short term successes in repelling and countering the opposing forces. Yet they likely do so at the cost of longer-term defeat. When each militia faction is militarily active, the opposing and complimentary beliefs described above will come into play very heavily. Those who possess contradicting ideologies will oppose each other's expansion, alliances will be made between those militia's with compatible views, claims will be staked and fought over, and the resultant tide of internal chaos will draw the lesser government powers into play. Even as the primary opposing force plays the various factions off of one another, the State governments will attempt to control their own territory by use of the police forces and national guard. The short term success the current militia movement might achieve would serve only to rally each militia's opposition against it. This cycle would continue until the movement was destroyed piecemeal. The largest and most successful militias might hold out for a significant time, but that merely results in them being the military "hard targets" that would be temporarily bypassed and dealt with later.
Under the new system, the United States may be recognized as ripe for this type of war, for it is already neatly divided into independent zones of influence: The States themselves.
Because the new Militia is politically active and connected to the public will, it can find opportunity to generate effects in the greater political spectrum in the event of conflict, instead of the limited military spectrum of the current movement. By co-opting their local government systems as advised earlier, the combined Militia Movement of a given state, being clear in it's purpose and mandate to protect the public, can generate significant public pressure on the government of their State. This government is thereby presented with an uncomely choice: Cooperate with the Militia, or be overthrown by the Militia, either legally through the votes of the Militia-respondent public, or militarily with the publics support.
When the Militia Movement, as defined by the combined Militias of the towns, provinces, and counties that make up a state, as well as their civilian and political backers, have influence over a state's government, that entire state becomes the movement's area of operations. The States are already quasi-independent, with their own infrastructure, budgets, taxation powers, and the lawful authority to hold a military defense force in their respective National Guard and State Guard (where applicable) forces. The advantages of legitimately co-opting the State government can not be understated, but it requires the Militia Movement of an entire state to act politically in a unified front - something only possible under the new system, and virtually unimaginable under the old.
In this type of war, each state will the the area where the Militia Movement may successfully utilize guerrilla warfare to it's full effect. When the political system is unsympathetic to pressure from the primary opposition, the opponent's only recourse will be found in using force to enact it's will across a broad area of unwilling population. This is the traditional kettle in which the recipe of guerrilla war is prepared, and it is the environment where it is at it's greatest strength.
It requires only limited military cooperation between the different Militias in the state - each one responsible for it's own AO, and perhaps calling on help from neighboring Militias to resist larger enemy advances. The pennies can be kept in order, and in due time the dollars will take care of themselves. The opposition's political will can eventually be sapped, and compromises made to either repair the damage done that began the conflict, or to secure some form of independence from it's abuses. If conflict were to happen on a national scale as the current movement predicts, it means that some states would be under the influence of the Movement, others would remain under loyalist control (those states that had not yet suffered sufficient abuse for the Movement to take root, or whose public were supportive of those abuses as in some of the hardline leftist states) and each of the Militia controlled states would likely remain independent of the others due to their own local "flavor" of government and leftover distaste for an overarching government structure. In the "best case" scenario, America would become two independent or semi-independent nations - one built around the current political spectrum and those states who would preserve it, and one built by the states opposed to the ideology and methods of that government and whose people seek a different path.
In reality, a more numerous breakup is likely, with several states choosing to remain independent and continue the "American Experiment" our forefathers spoke of in their own ways. Either way, the idea of national unity of the United States would be finished.
It should be noted however, that if this War Plan were chosen and met with a significant level of success, it opens a door to the "third path." A secret weapon that is the Militia Movement's Nuclear Option in the event of conflict. I'll be describing this in a later chapter.
On The Militiant CoupEdit
The holy grail of an opposition movement is rarely the forced breakup of a nation. To topple the existing regime and replace it with one more oriented to the will of the people is a far more advantageous outcome. It preserves large scale infrastructure. It preserves the overall size and efficacy of the national economy. It preserve the existing institutions as viable tools, and places them in the hands of a more suitable worker. It reduces the burden of diplomatic issues and issues of recognition and international legitimacy. It maintains avenues of trade and preserves the military. It is also far harder to accomplish.
In order for a coup to be successful there are several requirements that must be met.
The coup force must have legitimate mandate from a majority of the public nationwide.
The existing regime must have lost it's legitimacy in the eyes of a majority of the public nationwide.
A national council must be elected by the Movement to present the public and the world with a political face.
The coup force must be able to move rapidly with a "plug and play" authority structure, having planned out offices and made political, economic, diplomatic, and military appointments and decisions in advance. There must be absolutely minimal time between the fall of the old regime and the installation of the new, transitional government.
The coup force government must be open and honest about it's methods of rule, it's political orientations, the changes that it will be making, and how the new government that succeeds them will be expected to behave.
They must not plan to occupy the seat of government long, acting only transitionally until a new Republic government and Constitution can be established. They must be prepared to disarm and disband in an orderly fashion when their job is done, leaving no potentially destructive remnants.
These are the political preconditions required for a militant coup to succeed. There are military considerations as well. In order to enact their, and the people's political will the Movement must first achieve actual victory and displace the existing regime by making use of the following factors:
High level organization. The Militia Movement must be able to coordinate forces across large areas and act in broad fronts in the sectors of armed conflict, political action, and civil disobedience. It is a three-pronged strategy that requires careful coordination.
To the greatest extent possible, the Movement must include within it's ranks sympathetic public figures from the existing regime and national military.
It must have a high proficiency in military action. The various Militias must at some point merge into a traditional army structure. Commanders should be drawn from those with experience in the regular Army whenever possible, and moderately high levels of discipline be enforced.
It must establish a broad logistics base, capable of supplying large quantities of small arms ammunition, explosives, and heavier weapons. Domestic factories must be established and kept to a much more professional level of production than the crude “bomb factories” seen in foreign insurgencies.
It must establish a national intelligence network, drawing on local authorities and sympathetic members of the existing regime and Army.
It must combine traditional military warfare with special operations in the political and civil spectrum. It must be capable of coordinating riots, general strikes, voting campaigns, assassinations, and large scale military maneuvers all with equal proficiency.
In it's military planning it must be even more clear and simple than in typical military fashion, to account for the lesser experience of the Militiamen who are fighting.
It's strategic military goals should be determined by the national council with input from regular Army members, and the units involved informed with the intent of their operation and the timeline for it's completion. Let those units then proceed with their mission by whatever means they consider most appropriate. Maximize freedom of movement and decisionmaking on the front lines to react more quickly than the enemy, with their command-and-control heavy style of fighting.
Aim to decapitate the serpent. Avoid conflict with the claws except when necessary to clear a path to the head. If you only have to engage 2% of the Army to reach an objective, then the strength of the other 98% is wasted. Size matters not.
Much argument is made against the present movement that the military force of the existing regime is invincible, or that the only way of successfully challenging it is through guerrilla warfare as in the middle eastern wars. This is a fallacy for two reasons.
Firstly is that the Army does not exist as a single dot on the map, with all of it's power concentrated. It is only as effective as it is because it takes the initiative and attacks with great preparation to use all of it's power at once. A single platoon guarding the entrance to a compound does not wield the strength of the entire army.
Secondly, an Army defending an area lacks initiative - it is the attackers who choose the time, place, and circumstances of battle, and it takes time for the enemy to react. This creates a window of opportunity where the attacker may engage, accomplish it's mission, and withdraw in comparative safety. The fighting style of the new Militia is essentially one of a small army that gathers, strikes, and disperses again with it's equipment only to gather at a different location and strike again. Repetition of this action by a large number of forces, not unlike a "flash mob" of protesters, can penetrate an enemy defensive organization by "chewing" it from multiple fronts. With the aid of modern communications technology, such forces can be coordinated across large battlefronts to engage and defeat much more powerful opposition forces.
On Political H-Bombs and "The Third Way"
The above two segments outline both of the "traditional" ways by which orchestrated tyranny may be fought and overcome. However, America, in all it's uniqueness has left another option. Our forefathers were imperfect men, as all men are, but they had vision beyond their years and beyond the centuries to acknowledge, at least implicitly, the cyclical nature of peoples and governments. Nothing in politics is static. Creating a "perfect" society and government, and having it remain such against all forces of change and social and technological development is an impossibility. What they created in the founding of our nation was not an ironclad wall that they expected would remain invincible to government encroachment, but a set of tools that their descendants might use to preserve the ideals of that nation in the face of such forces. And those tools are quite robust.
Among the powers and authorities enshrined in the constitution, most of the focus is typically given to the Bill Of Rights. This is natural because it is the section of the document most protective of individual citizens, and the one most often directly threatened. However there are other things in that wondrous piece of parchment that the people, and especially the Militia Movement, ought to take notice of. I speak of a weapon of indescribable power. A tool of radical change. One that completely dominates and overrules the entire Federal government system literally at a stroke. The Nuclear Option of the New Militia: Article V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
There are two mechanics outlined within for amending the US Constitution. The first is the familiar way, where an amendment is proposed by congress and then submitted to the states for ratification. The second is a much more revolutionary mechanism. If the states themselves, as independent entities, call for a convention to amend the constitution directly, that convention then has the same power as congress to offer up amendments for those same states to ratify. In layman's terms, the states themselves have the power to completely override the Federal government and amend the US Constitution with neither their permission nor their input, the constitution explicitly states that any such amendments, properly ratified, are binding, and there is not a thing the government can do about it.
It does not take much deep political discourse to understand the political implications of such a mechanism. It is nothing less than a gated, guarded "reset button" for the entire country and it's government. It is the soul of a velvet revolution given form in ink and parchment. A final defense, though made appropriately difficult to use, against Federal over-reach and tyranny.
The powers of the convention called by invoking Article V are limitless, except for the single provision that they be acceptable to three-fourths of the states. If the convention so chose, the entire Constitution could be thrown out and written anew, as was done already by our forefathers in the scrapping of the Articles of Confederation. It is the ultimate political weapon of the Movement, though actually employing it is no easy matter.
For Article V to be invoked, two-thirds of the state legislatures must submit a petition to do so. Furthermore, three-fourths of the state legislatures must be willing to ratify whatever changes might be made by the convention. In practical terms, the Militia Movement's perspective can be summarized thusly:
The sum total of states who's legislatures are beholden to the Militia Movement within their state, plus those States who are sympathetic to the Militia's political stances, plus those States who are independently opposed to the actions and ideologies of the Federal government, must be equal to or greater than thirty-eight.
That seems like a daunting number, but it can be reduced using the proper methods.
Only thirty-four states are required to call the convention. Once it is called, each state appoints delegates to actually attend it and participate. It is not actually those states that hold power over the convention, but the delegates as individuals. If the majority of the delegates who are appointed to execute the convention are sympathetic to the Militia Movement, then the convention is co-opted in it's entirety. The number of State legislators required to be under the influence of the Movement is reduced from hundreds to perhaps a few dozen.
Next, the amendments proposed by the convention must be submitted to the States and ratified by three-fourths, or thirty-eight of them. Regardless of which War Plan the Movement has chosen, a number of States will likely be under their political control by the time this stage is reached. Those States may be counted on to ratify, provided the changes involved are proportionate, reasonable, and within the bounds their voting public would find acceptable. Those States who are not willing to ratify should be engaged first by diplomatic means - small concessions may be made within the conventions amendments to try and broker sufficient ratifications. Additionally, the old language of politics will play heavily, with issues such as taxation, regulation, crime and punishment, highway and education funding, and other infrastructure. The Movement should not be afraid to give lesser concessions to ensure ratification, provided the convention's amendments will accomplish the Movement's ultimate goals.
In the event that all reasonable concessions have been offered and rejected, a Militant strategy may become necessary in the weakest of the remaining holdout states. Each state government should be assessed for political and ideological strength and rated against the other remaining states. Starting from the weakest and moving up the rank to include the appropriate number of states, they should be targeted with systematic campaigns to force their compliance. Organized acts of civil disobedience, strikes, referendums, espionage, and even flash mob riots are effective tools for this purpose. Direct military options should be considered only as an absolute last resort, and terrorism must be removed completely from the table. In such a politically burdensome situation, the former poses a grave risk to the legitimacy of the movement, while the latter would obliterate it. And when approaching the throne of such a hallowed instrument of political power, legitimacy is everything.
Suggestions and the Militia Order of Battle
Only so that the accusation cannot be made that this topic concerns itself with the idea of a Militia Movement hierarchy without giving advice as to how the physical, nuts-and-bolts movement should be composed, I've decided to add this section. This is not a guide for standardization, or a set of unbreakable rules. I offer it only for those who want it, or who don't have the time or diplomatic fortitude to compose it themselves.
In common parlance:
A "Militia" is the individual paramilitary organization of a specific town or city. It is commanded by it's own Civil Power wing.
A "Militia Battalion" is the combined Militias of an entire county in that State. It is commanded by a council composed of one representative from the Civil Power, Public Relations, and Militia wing of each Militia that composes it.
A "Militia Division" is the combined Militias of a multi-county voting district. It is commanded by a council of twelve leaders elected by the governing councils of the Militia Battalions from which it is composed.
A "Militia Army" is the combined Militias of an entire State. It is governed by a council consisting of two representatives elected by each of the Militia Division councils, in complement with the co-opted government of the State.
A "Militia Grand Army" is the total force of all Militias across all states occupied by the Movement. It is ruled by a National Movement Coalition Council.
This national council should consist of one representative from each State, and be led by an executive board of twelve members who hold rotating seats. The National council must be an elected body, with each Militia Army council choosing three entrants from it's own State. These candidates would then be submitted to the entire PR wing of their state for a final vote.
As to the structure of the individual Militias, I suggest the following order of battle
Each Militia shall be composed of an Officer/Trainer Corps consisting of between 3 and 36 members. This is the central corp of the Militia and its primary purpose is outlined in the segments above. In short, it is to perform and coordinate public works in peacetime, and it will train, lead, and help supply the actual Militia body in wartime. It would be preferable that they have prior military experience in the regular army. They are directly subordinate to their Civil Power wing.
In addition there will be a Militiaman's Corps which will consist of all able-bodied volunteers from the Militia's Area of Operations. The following organization is given as a suggestion only.
Militia Unit - A six-man fireteam. Initially composed of a team leader with a radio and semiautomatic rifle, two designated marksmen with accurate semiautomatic rifles in larger caliber, a medic, and two riflemen with semiautomatic weapons in intermediate or larger caliber, and indigenous transport vehicle(s).
Militia Section - A group of two Units, with a logistical transport vehicle added.
Militia Platoon - A group of two to six Sections. May add Technicals or improvised armored vehicles as available.
Militia Fire Force - A group of two or more Platoons. May include private air assets and additional vehicles as available.
On Moderation, Measures of victory, and The Balloon Going UpEdit
One of the greatest risks associated with the rise of the New Militia is not the present threat of defeat, death, or incarceration. Rather it lies in the risk of excessive zeal in victory. Assuming the Movement pulls itself together and accomplishes whatever war plan it has collectively chosen, it must then deal with the aftermath.
Conflict is an ugly business, and the euphoria that follows success has an effect on those who hold the reins of power. Debts must be paid. Troops must be compensated. Prisoners must be managed. And above all, the Movement must make good on the various public mandates that spurred it's action in the first place, lest it's own legitimacy be destroyed.
What, then, is the goal of the Militia Movement?
It is, and must be, the restoration and fortification of those freedoms and immunities of the American public that are secured within the US Constitution and nothing more.
Those who end up holding the reins of power are at grave risk of making a fatal mistake: They will be tempted to use the existing system of legislative fiat to correct every tiny error that has been made to facilitate oppression by burdening the government with mountains of specific restrictions. This is untenable for two reasons. Firstly, the government is necessary - it is an entity that serves a specific purpose in regulating the behavior of the States and protecting the nation as a whole from outside interference. Secondly, it is occasionally necessary for the government, any government, to assume certain powers in cases of emergency. If it is forbidden from doing so, and the public suffers as a result, then the government can again find cause to challenge it's restraints and likely win public support in doing so. It is precisely that process that got us into this trouble in the first place. Rather than targeting the mass of problems resting in the wake of the government, the Movement should call to mind the path of a rifle bullet.
When a rifle is fired, the bullet leaves the barrel in a straight and true path. But no rifleman, nor government, nor constitution, is perfect. If the shooter is off in his aim by even a fraction of a degree, the bullet will deviate from it's intended path. The longer the bullet flies, or the nation and government persists, the farther off course the path will go. The tiniest error, made early on at the foundation level, will grow to colossal proportions in time.
So excellently designed was the US Constitution that it will have taken more than two hundred and thirty five years for the nation it defined to have drifted so far off course. That is profound, and it philosophically suggests that the fundamental causes of the drift are not related to the clusterfuck of individual issues we presently face, but stem from infinitesimally small errors made at the time of the founding. Whatever changes the Movement applies in making good it's victory must be geared towards correcting these tiny oversights, not waging a battle of laws against a hundred thousand individual cases. America was created as a "great experiment" and when an experiment fails, it is the environment and initial conditions that are adjusted, and not a piece-by-piece modification of the failed result.
A government is a living body of people, no different from the people that make up the Militia Movement. It has it's own lines in the sand whereby, if it has public support in doing so, it too will be willing to violate the laws that bind it in order to work some public good. For freedom to persist, the government's authority must be restrained. Yet if any of the restraints are too tight and encumbering, they will be cast off at the first sign of public necessity, by force if necessary, and the government will be again set on the slow, creeping path to tyranny.
This is the dilemma, and balancing these forces calls for discretion and moderation. I encourage those who end up in the position to make such judgments to study our national history carefully. Seek the oldest and most original usurpations of the Constitution, and structure your reforms to solve these contradictions that once occurred in a manner that favors the public freedom in your time. I make no suggestion of specific actions, but I would point out certain occurrences which to me seem in need of scrutiny.
- The Constitution gives no guide as to who defines a law as constitutional or not. This allowed the Supreme Court to take that power unto itself. Perhaps it would be better that the State legislatures decide?
- The Constitution guarantees trial by jury, but makes no specific mention of the powers of the jury.
The Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war, but absent a definition of "war" or enumeration of those who we may declare war against, we have engaged in many "support campaigns" "drug wars" and "police actions."
The Constitution grants all non-enumerated powers of government to the States or the People via the 10th amendment, but other clauses are allowed to create "implied" powers, some of which are nearly limitless in scope.
The Constitution does not require a balanced budget, and allows the government to accrue debt.
The Constitution gives Congress the power to tax, but does not require that those taxes be collected (passing a tax that is not collected is used as a means of making a thing contraband), and places no limits on taxation.
The Constitution establishes the Bill of Rights, but does not define their relative importance, allowing courts to hold human rights at different levels of scrutiny.
The Constitution does not define any punishment for violating it's restrictions or protective rights, or specify who should judge and carry out such punishments.
The Constitution does not provide, but also does not prohibit or regulate, the Government in delegating it's powers to agencies.
The Bill of Rights does not provide a specific guarantee of citizen's privacy, including privacy by dilution in volume (data mining).
The Constitution provides no authority for the government to protect the environment, regulate dangerous products, build and maintain Interstate highways, or enact other public works.
The Constitution does not define the word "regulate" nor impose limits on what degree of regulations are allowed.
The Constitution does not have a mechanism to grant short-term expanded powers to the Government in the event of widespread national emergency. I would suggest that any such emergency must be agreed to by the State legislatures of the entire country, in addition to the Federal government, in order to activate any such powers, and that a strict, non-extendable time limit be imposed upon their activation.
The Constitution does not prohibit political parties and voting blocs in government, but also does not regulate their powers or behavior.
This is not a comprehensive list of potential Constitutional oversights, and there may be those that are resolved in the future, and likely more added in time.
In addition to caution in the achievement of victory, the Movement must not make the classic mistake of allowing their desire for perfection to over-ride an opportunity to achieve significant gain.
The cost-benefit ratio of engaging in such a war as this is not a static value, independent of small successes. It is a sliding scale whose position is determined by the political will of the Movement itself and the primary opposition. The Movement must be reasonable and rational in all things, and if a point should be reached in the conflict where politics may be resumed in favor of fighting, it should be seriously considered. If all, or even a significant number of the Movement's goals can be achieved in return for abandoning further violence, the option should be a subject of fervent command discussion and considered by the Movement with the utmost respect. We have successfully argued that war is sometimes necessary, but the greatest victory is ever the battle rendered unnecessary by other means.
The sacrifice permitted to achieve victory must be in proportion to the victories achieved. In simpler terms, if the Movement can negotiate an outcome that would remedy at least a significant number of it's grievances, it should consider that option over fighting on for total victory and risking future defeat. “Pride has an honored place on the battlefield, but only reason may sit at the bargaining table.”
In the public discourse of the current militia movement, much ado is often made about the circumstances under which the various militias would act upon their implicit threat. Anyone who publicly supports a militia, or even the idea of the militia's purpose or history, will eventually be challenged on this basis.
"Sounds like someone's too much of a neckbeard to do anything real..."
These questions often go unanswered, and there are many reasons for this, but the consequence is that the audience to such debates is often led to believe that the supporter has no reason, and is thus a coward, invalidating his proclaimed staunchness of belief in defense against tyranny.
The reasons for his silence may be myriad. For one, threat of action can be construed as a criminal threat if specific conditions are attached to it. The would-be militiaman is necessarily wary about such a mechanism being used to persecute him legally. Secondly, he or she may want to avoid being monitored under such circumstances as he would like to enumerate. If those agents of the opposition who monitor such things can record that this person will commence militant acts against them under "X circumstances" then if such circumstances should shortly be decided on by the opposition, the person has preemptively made themselves and those who associate with them to be targets.
Under the present system, each individual masks his intent in this way. Their line in the sand is kept as a closely guarded, private matter, in an attempt to "stay off the enemy's radar". This makes it less likely that their individual preparations will be interrupted or preempted before they have at least had a chance to strike or organize. Their silence is not cowardice, but a survival mechanism in a hostile political climate.
On Tactics, Diplomacy, and The Air-To-Ground BattleEdit
In the circumstance of wide-scale conflict, the Militia Movement will be faced with a number of tactical choices. While the tactics of the individual Militias fighting will largely be determined by their own training regimen and their available technology, there are certain generalities that may be engaged before the actual event of boots-on-ground combat. Regardless if it is guerrilla warfare in defense of their States and respective AO, or a coordinated, semi-conventional shooting war for conquest of the nation, there are certain truths of modern combat that will remain immutable.
The first is that terrorism, as a tactic, does not work on Americans. We are a nation of patriotic individuals, and any act of terrorism that causes civilian (and often even exclusively military) damage is openly reviled, and answered by calls for strength and combativeness, not surrender or influence. Much of the tactical planning of the current militia movement concerns itself with the methodology of destroying bridges, government buildings, assassination of public figures, and attacks on infrastructure and individuals. While this may certainly be possible with the proper equipment and training, and may be politically satisfying to those "barking dogs" mentioned early on in the topic, it accomplishes exactly nothing from the perspective of achieving the movement's goals. Terrorism as a tactic has no future in America, and neither would it's proponents. Legitimacy is the key to the Militia's power, and the American public does not forgive.
It being established that the primary purpose of the Militia is to protect the public, this goal is incompatible with any tactic that brings harm to the public property or infrastructure beyond an absolute, limited, and immediate military necessity. It is the difference between disabling a single bridge to slow an enemy column, and attacking bridges across the US in a coordinated plan to destabilize the economy. One is proper use of military force to protect the public - the other is terrorism.
The argument for resorting to terrorist tactics is made primarily by those who feel that the military power of the authorities is unchallengeable. If you believe that the alternative to terrorism - open battle by conventional means, is suicide, then the choice is an easy one to make. A dirty victory, however small, is superior to a helpless defeat. Yet this does not need to be the case.
I stated above:
Much argument is made against the present movement that the military force of the existing regime is invincible, or that the only way of successfully challenging it is through guerrilla warfare as in the middle eastern wars. This is a fallacy for two reasons.
Firstly is that the Army does not exist as a single dot on the map, with all of it's power concentrated. It is only as effective as it is because it takes the initiative and attacks with great preparation to use all of it's power at once. A single platoon guarding the entrance to a compound does not wield the strength of the entire army. Secondly, an Army defending an area lacks initiative - it is the attacker who chooses the time, place, and circumstances of battle, and it takes time for the enemy to react. This creates a window of opportunity...
This is a universal principle of warfare. The side who holds the initiative has the advantage. They choose the conditions, the weather, the distance, the terrain, and in part even the weapons that the battle will be waged with. The opposition army is neither invincible, nor even especially strong. It is very, very skilled at attacking with initiative and making use of advanced technologies to expand that momentary advantage even further. Denied the initiative, as in an occupation or defensive role, it can be beaten. Smaller detachments can be singled out and engaged by superior numbers with up-to-the-task equipment. Large enemy formations could easily seize the initiative for themselves, and should be avoided as hard targets or engaged only by large, coordinated "swarms" of highly-mobile Militia forces.
The above thesis applies only to the traditional ground forces in open and unconventional combat. The air force is another matter, and modern warfare has another unbreakable rule of conventional battle: There can be no land victory without air supremacy.
I have noticed that very little discussion of opposing airpower has been raised in the subject of an American War. While the Militia Movement may have access, through it's own endeavor, to anti-armor weapons with reasonable efficacy, even to someone technically minded it would seem that there is no means by which to engage aircraft.
American civilians have a great deal of technological advantage over other nations in the event of domestic conflict. We have entire hobbyist networks who develop various obscure technologies like rocketry, model aircraft, home chemistry, and radio and computer technology in private. All of these can be weaponized to one degree or another as detailed in Appendix D-H. What would a technically-savvy Libyan Rebel have been willing to part with in June of 2011, for $5000 US Dollars and three hours with a Radio Shack catalog? And America also has, at the time of this writing at least, a dearth of overqualified, underemployed, college educated engineers, scientists, math graduates, chemists, machinists, and physicists. These two factors, united, could produce military technology easily the equal of any third-world regime or 1960's era Soviet nation, and likely better, if in smaller quantity.
Yet the problem of the air-to-ground battle persists. Even assuming the driving technological forces above can be harnessed, it must be kept in mind that the need for air supremacy is one of the oldest understandings of modern war. As a result, air defense systems tend to feature the most cutting edge technology available to the nation. As a consequence, the air force with which the Militia Movement would have to contend, incorporates cutting edge technology designed to defeat the world's best air defense systems. Try as they might, the Militia has virtually no hope of fielding an air defense capable of truly thwarting such massively advanced airpower.
It is at this realization that the present movement, and indeed, the FYS crowd in general, appear to throw up their hands in defeat. But as with most things in conflict, and most obstacles that seem insurmountable, there is another way. Or specifically, two ways - one diplomatic, and one militant.
The first option is the diplomatic path.
It seems like an obvious statement, but it will bear repeating that if an opponent stands in your path, but can not be defeated, it is an option to convince him to move out of the way of his own free will. To co-opt him. It may sound far-fetched that an entire enemy military subsection would be willing to sit-out a major campaign, but an organization already exists whose aim is to accomplish just that: The Oath Keepers. They are an organization of military and law enforcement personnel who have taken it upon themselves to redouble their oaths to the American public, stating openly in the process that they would "stand down" from any unconstitutional order to attack the people of the United States. If that organization were to focus its efforts on the US Air Force, with support from the New Militia Movement, the effective power of the enemy's air assets could be greatly impacted. Even barring defection, the movement could manifest itself in faulty targeting, sabotaged intelligence, leaked IFF codes, pilots who refuse to drop their bombs, or planes with falsified "mechanical problems" that keep them out of the fight. The advantage of supporting passive resistance from such an organization taken root in the Air Force can not be undervalued.
Additionally, for those units who are unreceptive to the public will there is a military option left. Aircraft are not always airborne, and in the significant time they spend on the ground they are quite vulnerable to sabotage and stand-off attack as well as special forces operations. If a major offensive battle is planned, other Militias could be called in to launch simultaneous preparatory strikes on grounded aircraft stationed within combat range of the target. Modern aircraft are very complex machines, and it does not require a great deal of damage to challenge their airworthiness. Certainly a combination of pre-existing sabotage, infiltrator-placed satchel bombs, runway mines, and vehicle-mounted medium and large mortars firing shrapnel charges at hangars and runways could do a great deal to reduce and delay the power of enemy air assets.
The Militia land forces need only fear the aircraft that are both in operational range of them, and capable of getting off the ground. The number this constitutes can be much reduced with proper planning and coordination.
Furthermore, if the Militia proves technologically competent enough to create first or second-generation equivalent short range surface to air missiles (something difficult, but well within the realm of possibility), the few that are made can be employed to good effect in ambush fashion against attack helicopters and gunship aircraft - the two greatest air-to-ground threats they are likely to face. Even simpler anti-aircraft systems that are analogous to the German Fleigerfaust and Finnish anti-helicopter mine could be created in number and employed in ambush near enemy airfields and suspected landing zones. Aviation fuel storage depots can be destroyed or disabled, and transport trains and trucks carrying fuel and munitions can be sabotaged. If the enemy is invincible in his operating environment, he must be denied the opportunity to enter that environment by attacking him at every point outside it.
On Public Relations and The Divide Between The Old and NewEdit
One of the more unfortunate casualties of the rise of the New Militia is the better part of the old militia. As much as I disdain the sorry state and abundant mistakes of the movement as it exists today, there is a substantial population within its numbers who genuinely mean well despite their movement's failings. Some of these people may have precisely the sort of military experience that the New Militia could make use of, and may even want to enlist under it's auspices. But this, at least initially, cannot be allowed.
The problem stems from the public relations taint that the movement currently bears. In the construction of the New Militia, military discretion and a painstaking quest for acceptance are the first baby steps to be taken toward ultimate success. The new movement can not afford the risk of being seen as an offshoot or subsection of the old movement. This would destroy their attempt at gaining legitimacy before it even got off the ground and the movement would be stillborn.
The new movement must, as a matter of hard necessity, be composed of new faces and a new foundation, with no ties to the old. This means a blank slate when it pertains to contacts, suppliers, fundraising, and infrastructure. The up side is that a clean slate means the movement can establish itself correctly from the outset, and avoid most of the problems that plague the old movement. This has already been discussed at length in the sections above.
So what, if any, part can the old militia play?
The old militia may still have a place at the table beyond that of pariah terrorist and extremist. This involvement however, is keyed upon two things: First is that those members of the old movement who are moderate and more intelligent than their peers are willing to wait patiently instead of giving in to the movement's extremist angles at the first sign of trouble. The second is that they must do so silently, without attempting to involve themselves with, or opposing, the New Militia.
In common parlance, they must "sit out the game until halftime." While the new movement can not associate with them openly for fear of threatening their legitimacy, the skills and resources they possess can still be an asset in the event of actual conflict. At that point in time, legitimacy will be established already and it would not do much damage to the movement to have old-militia members supporting it and guarding it's flanks.
While the New Militia is geared more towards behaving as a proper army, those units of the old militia who can be co-opted to the Movement's aid can be utilized in supporting roles - particularly special operations, where the small, private nature of the old militia structure can lend itself well to secrecy, and where their small numbers are less of a disadvantage. In an actual conflict environment, they can be envisioned acting as scouts, skirmishers, saboteurs and sappers, and performing tasks such as targeted killings and ambush attacks on enemy supply lines and travel routes to cause general degradation of the opponent's infrastructure. This spares the main body of the movement from having to devote forces and supplies to this end, keeps the old militia units from degrading to terrorism and causing trouble, and does have a small but possibly significant effect on the enemy's morale and supply chain.
Furthermore, if these militias can be induced to cause enough trouble, it could force the primary opposition forces to spread their assets thinner: Every convoy would need guard vehicles, every fuel depot and ammunition dump would need tight security, and every military installation would have to be kept in a state of near perpetual lockdown. All of these things are advantageous to the New Movement in the event of war.
It must be forewarned however, that these units are not to be trusted with sensitive intelligence or large responsibilities. For many years they have been infiltrated and co-opted by the intelligence forces of the primary opposition. A certain percentage of them are enemy intelligence assets, and it can be said with certainty that a percentage of those who make themselves useful to the New Militia would be as well. This could be useful in the art of counterintelligence as a pathway down which to inject false information and thereby protect other operations, but it will remain a double edged sword.
On Uniforms and UniformityEdit
As a militant organization seeking a legitimate path to power, the New Militia will likely find itself bound, at least loosely, by the International Laws of Land Warfare. While it is true that irregular armies often forego the Geneva conventions, there are certain small advantages to voluntarily adhering to them.
There are many facets of the Geneva conventions that are likely to be ignored by the Militia in the name of expediency. The conventions were, after all, agreed upon by major national powers fighting major national wars. The rules of a civil conflict are far more ad hoc, owing to the unprofessional nature of the combatants and the necessarily loose chain of command. However, there are two tenants which should be adhered to even if all others are abandoned: Treatment of prisoners and the wearing of distinctive uniform.
In adhering to the Geneva convention rules on the treatment of enemy prisoners, the Movement can take steps to garner more of the ever important legitimacy. The American public never looks favorably upon people who act in an inhumane manner. What would be lost if the Militia were shown to be bloodthirsty killers in the mistreatment or execution of their captured sons, brothers, sisters, and others who were put by happenstance on the opposing side of the conflict? The answer is a great deal. In fact the damage done to the moral authority, public mandate, and legitimacy of the movement would be so devastating that it can not be enumerated in full. I will leave the topic at that. Prisoners must be treated at least humanely, and given basic accommodations and medical care.
The wearing of uniforms poses a unique logistical problem - The uniform is one of the elements, like weapons and ammunition, that should ideally be provided by the individual militiaman for himself, long before the start of actual hostilities. Yet if the movement is required to be cohesive, and recognized as a single unified force as in New Militia doctrine, then somehow it must be coordinated in advance what the standard uniform should be. The problem arises from two factors: The first is "how does the entire militia decide in advance what uniform to use?" and the second is "Where can the uniform be obtained that everyone in every possible area of operations across the US has access to it and can afford it?"
Many debates are based on the merits of different camouflage uniforms. In particular, the old US Army Woodland BDU pattern, modern ACU pattern, and the more effective but much more expensive Multicam pattern vie for the position of "best uniform" along with dozens of foreign made patterns available on the surplus market.
This may be overthinking the problem. The Laws of Land Warfare require only that the uniform be distinctive and visible at a distance. The uniform does not need to encompass all or even part of the actual camouflage attire of the militiaman to satisfy the law. I propose the following: A length of wide red, white, and blue ribbon of any color configuration, be tied around the bicep of the left arm and stitched in place to the fabric of the camouflage top, with 15cm left danging from each end of the knot, as the standard uniform for the Militiaman's Corps. Officers and Squad leaders wear the same ribbon, but on both arms.
Red white and blue ribbon is cheap, readily available as thousands of locations, and the wearing of it on the arms is both distinct and visible at a distance. This means that the acquisition of such uniforms can be done expediently. Furthermore, it allows the necessary freedom for each unit, or each individual, to choose camouflage attire best suited to their operational area and personal budget, while still keeping a sense of uniformity throughout the Movement.
On The Early Battle and Effective Employment of Civilian WeaponsEdit
As a matter of necessity in building legitimacy, it is required that the Militia component of the movement, that is to say the armed paramilitary enforcement wing, maintain its arms and ammunition in a strictly lawful manner. This provides certain key advantages in the Movement-building process: First, it protects the group from preemptive prosecution on the ever-popular anti-militia grounds of gun law violations. Secondly, it preserves the civil-service character of the Movement by maintaining an air of being law-abiding, which the public will notice and appreciate. Thirdly, if the Militia is fighting with the weapons of common Americans it represents a propaganda victory in the early stages of the conflict, particularly if they win, and may inspire fence-sitters who have access to similar weapons to take up arms themselves.
While the civilian structure of the Militia's armaments are necessary for these reasons, this situation is not without it's drawbacks.
Primarily, civilian weapons are relegated only to semi-automatic modes of fire. This is adequate for infantry engagements (indeed, many regular Army personnel attest to only using their service rifles in the semiautomatic mode despite the availability of burst and fully automatic), but it may appear to fall short in serving the need for suppressing fire.
Appearances can be deceiving. Under current regular Army doctrine (notwithstanding changes made on the ground by the individual soldiers and units) fire suppression is accomplished by the squad's Light Machinegun assets - the rest of the squad acting in support of the machinegunners or as a flanking team to assault the enemy who is being suppressed. Using the machinegun for fire suppression is very effective, but also very inefficient. This is especially true in the case of a small military force likely strapped for resources. If fire suppression in combat is to be achieved, then how can the Militia compete? Later on as the conflict escalates and the public becomes less scrutinizing and more demanding of the Militia's ability, automatic weapons will likely be procured, captured, or manufactured in quantity. What to do before that point?
Fire suppression comprises two factors: The first is physical suppression of an area - placing enough rounds into that area as to create an unreasonable hazard to any soldier trying to enter or cross it. This area can be an alley, a section of defilade, a window, or the corner of a building or other chokepoint. This is accomplished by volume of fire, and is the aspect where the LMG proves the most useful. The second factor is psychological suppression - instilling fear into the party being suppressed such that their natural reaction to take cover overrides their protocol to be aggressive. This still requires a volume of fire, but it is much more efficient and less ammunition intensive to execute:
According to combat psychology studies done in the late 1990's, the average volume of fire required to force a squad to take and maintain cover was 1 shot fired approximately every two seconds, directed immediately above or to the side of their cover position.
The Militia is capable of reproducing the effects of psychological suppression, and a portion of physical suppression using only conventional civilian firearms, provided they are properly employed.
A pair of shooters in the unit replace the conventional machinegunner and his assist. Each is armed with an accurate semiautomatic rifle that uses detachable magazines of the maximum reasonable capacity available. The rifles should be 5.56 caliber or 7.62 caliber, and fitted with a low magnification optical sight with a wide field of view. Assuming a magazine capacity of 25 to 40 rounds, even accounting for stoppages, each man so equipped could psychologically suppress an enemy unit for nearly a full minute between reloads. when acting in a pair, they place a significant enough danger of bullet impacts into their target area to have a reasonable chance of effecting physical suppression as well.
On Common Tactics and The Involvement of Opposing Civil ForcesEdit
It would be a mistake to try and establish tactical doctrine for the New Militia in advance. Civil conflict is ad-hoc by nature, and the circumstances under which the Militia will have to operate can not be predicted entirely in advance. Detailed tactical decisions should be left in the hands of qualified commanders at the time hostilities actually start. This being the case, there are still certain general points of tactically useful information that may be pointed out.
The armed forces of the primary opposition tend to make use of heavy body armor. This armor is comprised of kevlar-reinforced ceramic plates which, at the time of this writing are known to resist multiple strikes from 7.62x51mm armor piercing ammunition. In layman's terms, the body armor currently used by opposition troops can not be penetrated by any ordinary assault weapon round. Something more powerful, such as .300 Winmag Armor Piercing, .338 Lapua Magnum, .300 Weatherby Magnum, or .50BMG is required to reliably defeat enemy infantry armor. Since most such weapons will be employed in specialty roles, a change in tactics is required to bypass enemy body armor using more conventional intermediate caliber military-style weapons:
Combat gunfight and marksmanship training for all Militiamen should focus effort on placing shots in the pelvis of the target, the head, and the legs, in that order of priority. These represent, from easiest to hardest targets, the points of an enemy soldier's body that are NOT protected by heavy ceramic armor.
By training diligently to attack these points accurately and on reflex, the main defensive strength of the enemy's personal armor is bypassed. Without the effectiveness of that armor, it becomes dead weight which slows the enemy trooper down and makes him an even easier target.
Also at the time of this writing, the supposed enemy force is fielding very advanced thermal imaging systems on its various weaponry. This allows, when used in concert with modern night vision equipment, an almost unparalleled ability to dominate in nighttime combat. Militia operations should thus take place primarily during daylight hours to minimize this advantage. Night operations can be conducted, but only by small formations using thermal camouflage. Expedient thermal camouflage is produced by lining an ordinary ghillie suit or poncho with layers of mylar "space blanket" material, but this serves only to reduce the detection range of thermal equipment. It does not negate it and should not be relied upon for such.
Additionally, during night operations the opposing force makes frequent use of infrared illumination and laser-designation systems. These can be detected and observed by civilian passive night vision systems and even some camcorders. The advantage to being able to see an enemy squad leader flagging your camouflage unit with a weapon mounted infrared laser beam is obvious. The same is true with an overhead helicopter tracking your unit along its escape route with an otherwise-invisible infrared spotlight, both favored tactics of the opposition.
In general, units acting in offensive operations should keep in mind the ancient military rule of force superiority: Attack a small unit with three times it's number and equal weaponry to ensure the easiest victory, and withdraw before reinforcements arrive.
Sooner or later, civil authority assets are going to become involved in the fight and this is an eventuality that the Movement must be prepared to face. Combating a municipal police department is significantly different than fighting a conventional military force. The best approach is one of a hybrid political/military style that would not be unworthy of the name "enforced neutrality."
The Militia does not have the manpower to spare in enforcing every necessary tenet of local law in addition to it's larger campaign requirements. The conventional civil police force will be necessary. However, this force will be placed under significant political pressure to engage in opposition with the militia, even if the local government has been co-opted. The Militia can not afford to destroy the police force militarily, even though it would be less difficult than fighting the armed forces. The solution to this dilemma can be found in the tactics of the Provisional Irish Republican Army in the formation of "no-go" zones for police.
When the "Troubles" first began in Northern Ireland, the PIRA made it's initial militant move by cordoning off operational areas in several of the largest cities. These areas were small enough that the local populace could be protected from internal threats by the PIRA itself without overextending their resources. It was then made publicly clear that any police units attempting to enter these areas, alone or in force, to interfere with the PIRA operations would be engaged and destroyed without mercy.
A similar tactic would likely work well in the case of the Militia. It it were made clear that Militia operations were "off limits" to police involvement, and that the Militia would not otherwise oppose, target, or threaten the police force, and if this declaration were backed up ruthlessly with the threat of snipers, targeted killings, and raids on police executives at work and at home, the common police officer would be very hard to compel to "stick his neck out" when he could otherwise perform his normal duties in safety. Furthermore, owing to the human psychological trait of positive reinforcement overpowering negative reinforcement, the Militia should also make a portion of its resources available to assist the local police in their duties by locating witnesses, providing information relevant to other investigations, and assisting in search and rescue and similar operations as in peacetime.
By giving aid with one hand and instilling credible fear with the other, the municipal police forces can be kept out of the larger fight and still otherwise be used to accomplish their necessary duties.
On Enemy Politics, High Technology and Battlespace DominationEdit
In the last several sections we have discussed the birth, growth, advantages and disadvantages of the Militia Movement, but so far we have only made passing mention of the military and political characteristics of the primary opposition. We have scratched the surface of his night-fighting ability and some of the capabilities of his ground troops and civil forces. It is time for a more detailed look at the military capabilities of this technologically advanced foe, and a look at possible technological countermeasures that are within the Militia's likely abilities. There is no panacaea for the weaknesses suffered by a small militant force engaging with a larger, more technologically sophisticated foe, but there are always steps that can be taken to exploit the enemy's weaknesses and contain, confuse, or redirect his strengths. The analysis is begun with the traditional military OODA loop.
These are the four components that are used in the military process.
By observing, the force comes to know what the enemy is doing, what it's own forces are doing, what other influences are doing, and what objectives it needs to accomplish.
By orienting, it prepares its forces and directs its full attention to what is going on in the battlespace, and sets a particular objective to be accomplished.
In deciding, the force chooses how, when, where, and with what instruments it's power should be applied.
Finally the force acts, using it's power in the method it has determined will give it the greatest chance of accomplishing it's objective.
Much of the techniques of counterinsurgency and modern warfare are constructed around the concept of disruption of forces - "getting inside the enemy's OODA loop." His ability to act can be curtailed if the loop can be disrupted before that point.
This is a strategy that works both ways.
The OODA loop occurs at personal, tactical, and strategic levels, and may be countered at all of these. Countering the loop of the individual soldier or officer is best left to the minds of qualified tacticians and commanders in the field, but the other two may be engaged thusly:
- >Dummies and decoys, counterintelligence, anti-reconnaissance technology, secure communications
- >Co-option, propaganda, misrepresentation, damage to infrastructure
- >Disruption of communications, targeted killings, decoy operations, spoiling attacks, diversionary strikes
- >Conventional combat, ambush, striking priority targets to draw forces into the defense, counterattack
The overall goal of disrupting the OODA loop is to force the enemy out of "tempo." If his loop is disrupted at any point, then the subsequent phases of the loop after that point are null. In simple terms, if he can not Observe, he cannot Orient. If he cannot Orient, he can not Decide, and if he can not Decide, he can not Act. An enemy who can not Act is soon to be defeated.
The key to exploiting the OODA loop relies on the pace and organization of battle. Using the countermeasures above and others yet to be determined, the Movement can slow down the enemy's tactical and strategic OODA loop. This delay forces the enemy into a position where he attempts to react to the Militia's actions, but the circumstances of the battle have already changed by the time the reaction takes place. He attempts to react to the new circumstances, but by the time he can Act, the circumstances have changed again. He is forced into a position where he is always trapped "one step behind" and his abilities wither in the face of what appears to be a chaotic and unpredictable battlefield.
This same technique has been exploited with great success by the forces of the primary opposition itself, though conducted on a larger scale than the Militia will likely be capable of. When the OODA loop of an entire nation and government can be broken, as in the application of so called "shock and awe" warfare, that nation can fall to invasion in a matter of days. This is a lesson that the Movement should pay close attention to.
A large scale operation, planned across the full spectrum of the Movement, creates the possibility of crippling the entire opposing force en masse, if the OODA loop can be disrupted simultaneously across a broad front and that disruption exploited ruthlessly by prepared forces acting with the element of surprise. This is not as easy as it sounds, and will not be a panacaea for the longer-term militant struggle with such a large opposing force. Nevertheless, it is an operation principle with which the Movement could make much progress on a high-tech Military front where it might otherwise be outclassed.
>Who is the Militia, and how does one start?
If you agree on principle with the motivations and objectives of this treatise and fancy yourself a person of action, then the Militia has just started with you. You are the founder and the first member of your Militia, and it is a big responsibility. There are a number of important tasks which you must accomplish in order to take only the first step towards creating a functioning model of the New Militia. The first is to understand your own place in the final hierarchy, and also to understand your own limitations. You are not a leader. You are not a General. You do not command any troops, and you do not have any rank. Many would-be militiamen of the old system have in the past, fallen into a potent trap of the ego. Their militia was seen more to them as a tool for their own self-satisfaction of power than of fulfilling the Movement's lawful obligations. You are not that man.
You are not a leader. What you are now is an organizer and a referee.
A Militia is like any ordinary social construct of people. Outside of actual conflict where consent has been pre-decided (a concept that will be addressed below), you do not have the power or right to coerce anyone else into obedience, including those who would join your militia. Those who join you will do so, and will remain, only at their free choosing. What you must be as the organizer, is the glue that hold the militia together.
Your first step in creating your militia is to understand what it means to be that force which will hold your future militia together, and how your must behave and present yourself in order to serve this function.
Volumes can be written on the mechanics of such a role, and doubtless have been. Certainly there are those who have a natural affinity for moderating groups of people, and they will have a decisive advantage if they are so motivated to form a militia. Yet these skills are not exclusive, and can be learned:
>Communicate complex ideas to groups of people. >Maintain emotional control. >Solve problems in a group dynamic. >Moderate disagreements within a group of different people. >Capture and utilize the attention of an audience.
Assuming you naturally possess or have otherwise acquired basic skills in managing conflicts, you can approach the second major qualification for forming a Militia - Knowledge.
That Knowledge is Power is one of the oldest proverbs in the English language, and is no less true today than when it was first spoken. We can gain some advantage by understanding why.
When you possess knowledge that others do not, they will be compelled to you by two different mechanics. The first is natural human curiosity: People of similar mind tend to seek out sources for information that they find interesting, and to a "FYS" personality, knowledge of the actual waging of armed resistance can be a very enticing subject. The second mechanic is usefulness. If you possess a skill that others lack, you can provide that skill in times of need and in turn be fairly expected to demand that the skills of those others be put to use for you in equal measure. The more you can contribute, the more you can expect in return. Furthermore, people in groups tend naturally to follow the individual who has the best, most well-thought out ideas provided those ideas are communicated correctly.
In summary, the best militia will be composed of a "natural" group, and not one of purely forced uniformity as in a traditional military. The position of leader will naturally pass to whatever member possesses the best grasp of the immediate situation and can convey the best plan of action to his team-mates.
Your role as the organizer of the Militia is only to streamline this process, and to yourself lead only when your own knowledge and skill are paramount.
With this understood, the hardest task of forming your militia is now set before you: You must learn the entire set of practical military skills that the basic Militia unit may have need of, and you must be able to pass those skills on to others effectively.
In doing so you will have transformed yourself into the prototype; a viable seed that, when planted in fertile territory and provided with the proper nutrients and support may sprout and grow into a powerful force.
What knowledge then, should the organizer possess? And where to obtain it?
One of the greatest personality assets that a militia organizer can possess is that unique sort of encyclopedic memory that comes from holding a natural interest in a topic. Some men can tell you the name of every starting player for the 1962 New York Yankees off the top of their head, simply because their interest in the sport binds such facts in their mind. Your ability to perform this with ease in the field of military knowledge is among the best measures of your ability to organize a militia.
Each of the overarching wells of knowledge that the organizer must possess could be called a "Field of Understanding." You must have a good grasp of general knowledge in each of these categories. Furthermore, there is a second category called "Technical Understanding." These categories are specific technical skills that you must possess and be able to pass on to others.
Fields of Understanding
The largest and most difficult category. Conflict of any sort is little more, according to a great strategist of the past, then a continuation of politics by other means. In-depth understanding of the politics surrounding the militant situation, and the political results generated by your actions within both the halls of the opposition's leadership and the public at large is a key element in building and maintaining legitimacy. Any militant force must possess three political "messages" which its actions are designed to present and reinforce. One message is to their own followers, members, and sympathizers. The second is to the opposition's leadership and forces. The third is to the public who are not yet involved in the conflict. Each message must be tailored and delivered with its particular audience in mind. Examples follow:
To the Militia and its allies: >No Freedom, No Peace! We're not backing up any more!
To the opposing forces: >The harder you push, the harder we fight. We can be reasoned with and negotiated with, but we can NOT be coerced! How much is a fight worth to you?
To the public (via the media): >The enemy doesn't represent you! They don't care about you! Are you tired of taxes, fraud, [other issues that lie in the public consciousness]. We're fighting those things right now! Join us, and it will be worth it! We can win!
How each message is delivered is a key aspect in the political strategy of the Movement. Symbolism will play a heavy role in determining how actions are interpreted into messages. A hypothetical example establishing the message of "no freedom, no peace" as a rallying cry would be to leave a sanctified object, such as a flag, behind at the scene of a prominent action of widespread significance. How would the message be interpreted if the famous Appomattox Courthouse and its landmark, site of the surrender of the First Civil War, were symbolically demolished by special operations, without human casualty, and a flag bearing the slogan were raised nearby for all to see? With modern technology, a Twitter campaign tagging #nofreedomnopeace would be started and virally marketed across the internet immediately afterward, with more detailed explanations of the Movement and its purpose provided for those who want to know.
This is the raw principle of sending a political message. Tactical choices and actions must support messages in order to lend those messages power in the consciousness of their intended audience. Unsupported messages become lost at best, and misinterpreted negatively at worst.
>Second Field of Understanding - Psychology
Tying in with the first Field, the organizer must possess a good grasp of human psychology and how it operates, both in group context and with individuals.
One of the greatest responsibilities of the organizer is to act as the referee within his militia. Petty disagreements and struggles for power are a hallmark of the old movement, and must be stamped out. Beyond legitimacy, unit cohesion is the second most important factor in the Movement's existence. The one authority the organizer should not be afraid to claim as his is the authority to expel members from his group. This power must be used very judiciously and with utter impartiality - only severe or repeated infractions of a simple code of good behavior can be grounds for even the threat of expulsion. Nevertheless, when the attitude or words of a member threaten group cohesion, their presence should not be tolerated for long. It is better to have bad blood with a single evicted troublemaker than to allow the whole group to be poisoned by politics, drama, and vitriol. Before reaching that point it is the responsibility of the organizer to contain and defuse internal disagreements and arguments, to provide for the basic, patriotic emotional needs of his comrades, and to support a program of activity that is conducive to teambuilding and good morale.
Psychology comes into play in other areas. It is far easier to win friends and allies if you understand how to manipulate an individuals emotions and intellect. An organizer addressing an angry crowd of civilian protesters can find a field ripe with new recruits if he can effectively engage and channel the emotions and thoughts of the group in the direction of his choosing.
There is a hard science aspect to psychology and the manipulation of people in groups and individually. The famous book "How to Win Friends and Influence People" is an excellent beginner's text to understanding this world, and should be a permanent mainstay in any organizer's well-read book collection.
>The third field - Logistics and Economics
One of the reasons for occupying the Movement with civil works in peacetime is that it gives the organizer and members of the civil power wing the opportunity to built a working knowledge of logistics and economics in regards to operational planning and execution.
Logistics is a matter of simple mathematics that is carried out on complicated scales, especially for larger forces and more involved operations. People need food, clothing, shelter, toiletry and hygiene, training and morale materials. Equipment needs parts, fuel, lubricant, and other maintenance needs. In conflict, weapons need ammunition in large quantities and spare parts must be available. Humans in conflict need advanced medical care and required supplies. All of these things are quantifiable:
>A person needs so much food per day. Multiplied by the time expected for the operation, transport to and from the area, plus a 15% margin of error. This is the Ration.
The Ration is multiplied by the number of people participating plus a 5% margin of error in case of stragglers, loss, or civilians in need.
The total number of Rations take up so much cargo space and weight, and cost so much money.
The vehicles transporting the Rations need a certain amount of fuel cost to get them to the area and return, plus a 5% margin to cover long term wear and tear on the transport vehicles.
The people assigned to prepare, acquire, package, drive and maintain the transports, and distribute the Rations must all be compensated.
In hostile environments, the transports will need security elements requiring personnel, arms and ammunition, rations and toiletries, vehicles and fuel, spare parts and magazines, communication and medical supplies.
The cost in manpower and materials for even the simplest operations becomes daunting when in the position of having to arrange all the different factors and then consider the bill. And this entire example was only for food. Similar calculations must be done for everything involved in the operation, and all coordinated in such a way as to maximize efficiency and minimize cost. Logistics is of critical understanding, especially for the small scale, cash-strapped militant force that must both live within its means, and win within its means. An old adage suggests that the immediate victory goes "to he who gets there first, with the most.
A good overview of the subject and its complexity can be had by reading the US Army field manual on the subject:
But as always, the militia is free to think outside the box. The US Army wouldn't dream of sending out a call to have logistics bases use Fedex to ship thirty cartons of dried food and sixty cases of ammunition from randomly chosen bases around the country to a friendly address near a staging area two weeks prior to an operation. Creativity is a strength that can maximize available resources, and existing infrastructure should be used, when reasonably certain of security, to further operational goals.
>Fourth field: Strategy
This is a difficult concept to verbalize on the scales at which the militia operates, and I have struggled to forge a suitable explanation of its necessity for this work.
In the simplest summation, the interest of the organizer in strategy is this:
>With the end goal already decided - "the restoration and fortification of those freedoms and immunities of the people secured within the US Constitution" - the organizer must assess his area of operations for far-reaching military and political opportunities that he can take advantage of to further that goal in any way he can, by any effective means necessary.
Militia strategy is essentially a bucket list of potential operations. Each one is chosen based upon the available opportunities in the militia's AO, and prioritized by the amount of impact each would have towards accomplishing the Movement's overarching goal, instead of the more typical and common local concerns. It is the job of the organizer to be able to spot these opportunities and plan out means to take advantage of them. He must be able to combine his planning and logistical ability, his technical skill, and the skills and assets of his militia to execute these operations and further the Movement's national goals by causing political and military effects in his local area. We may examine this mechanism by way of hypothetical example:
>Suppose a Militia is operating in the area of the fictional town of Coastland in the northwestern part of the country. Within this region is a large political agency facility that stores and maintains records of private weapons purchases from across the country dating back 20 years or more, that are being used to enact weapon confiscations. A large, coordinated operation to remove this facility could be recognized as furthering the goals of the Movement by depriving them of these records. Devising an operation to accomplish this would constitute a strategic objective.
In contrast to this strategic target, a hypothetical tactical, or local target would be:
>Within the region of Coastland is a domestic police force headquarters with a well-stocked arms room. The organizer plans a raid to attack the facility by surprise and secure additional weapons and armor material, as well as vehicles, for immediate use by his and neighboring Militia forces.
The difference can be seen in the scale of the impact that the action causes. One benefits the local AO and its Militia's immediately. The other furthers the aims of the entire Movement toward their prime goal, even though the local Militia itself may not see any tangible results as far as their own operations are concerned.
The organizer must be able to tell the difference, identify these opportunities, and direct his forces in planning and executing these operations to take advantage of them. If every Militia across the region, either the stakes claimed or nationally as in the militant coup scenario, then the long term strategic successes may tilt the political and military fields sharply in the Movement's favor.
In addition to the various fields of abstract knowledge the organizer must possess, he is also required to be able to teach the various technical skills of the insurgent warfighter to the inexperienced and ordinary people who will be part of his organization. There are a number of these skills, and some will be more or less applicable to the area and environment the specific militia is operating in, but a few can be summarized here.
The greatest point to remember is that these skills can not be learned from the standpoint of simply reading a book. Once a basic training regimen is crafted from these sources and others, it must be practiced diligently - in the field, with real people and simulated environments. Four weeks of 5 hour a day training is an adequate goal for the common militiaman, but it is best to recognize that training in the field is superior to learning lessons the hard way in combat. This does not compare to the level of training provided to conventional military forces, but it should be manageable for the working timeframe of most American people, and is 150 hours of training that they would have lacked otherwise.
>Shooting and Marksmanship
The Militia Movement, even at its best, is likely to remain a logistical "small fry" in the grander scheme of things. In all insurgencies throughout modern history, the greatest crippling burden on the militant's operations is a lack of good quality ammunition. In the United States, many people possess robust stockpiles of weaponry as a hobby or private interest. Yet while one good rifle and a few spare parts might last a militiaman the entire war, even ten thousand rounds of ammunition may not be sufficient for one battle.
To somewhat mitigate this factor, marksmanship and carefully controlled fire must be a key element in militia combat training. Unlike the tribal warriors of the middle-east who hold down the trigger of a fully automatic weapon, the militiaman must carefully gauge his ammunition expenditure - placing rounds accurately and precisely and not relying on either fusillades of suppressive fire or individual "accuracy by volume."
The only way to learn this skill is through practice. Attend shoots at the nearest local gun range, and focus your time and training on accuracy. Seek and accept pointers from experienced shooters and do your best to develop a mastery of the art of shooting that you can express and teach to others. Many areas of the country now offer tactical carbine classes to civilians for a fee. It can be worthwhile to attend one or two of these classes and then practicing the basic drills they teach, so that a simplified version of these same professional courses can be incorporated into your own militia training regimen.
Resources also exist online and in print form that can be an aid in developing a training platform. Recommended works are:
>The Magpul Dynamics series of instructional videos. These provide great introduction material across fields of active carbine shooting, close combat, and long range rifle shooting in a very easy to digest format.
>"The Ultimate Sniper" by John Plaster. This book was written as a literal handbook for military and police sharpshooters, and covers in great detail all the aspects of long range marksmanship and camouflage in a "how-to" format.
>Paintball and Airsoft Battle Tactics. This book was written with the "paintball and airsoft" added with a wink and a nudge. Team shooting skills, ambush, counterambush, combat communication, immediate action drills, and many other detailed points of military combat knowledge are included. An excellent guide to the fundamentals of shooting and moving as a team.
Many webforums, such as The Snipers Hide (www.snipershide.org) can point a beginner in the right direction as well.
You must always remember that mastery of these skills is not just for your own self-betterment. You must be able to cherrypick the most useful elements from each source and compile them in such a way that you can teach them to others at the same level you have learned them. You must be able to teach the teachers - it is your most important responsibility.
>Physical Training, Health, and Fitness
The organizer must be capable of building a compact and effective fitness program to support the health, stamina, and combat ability of his Militia.
Weight limits should be set in proportion to physical height, and weigh maximums encouraged. While physical training itself is fairly straightforward and understandable, the more esoteric aspects such as diet, carbohydrate calculation, vitamin and mineral intake, and usage of supplements must all be factored in as well. Hygiene is important, and issues such as joint stress and mobility ailments like arthritis will be factors in dealing with older volunteers. If members require certain medicines, those should be acquired and kept in modest stockpiles.
Each training day session should begin with a half-hour block of physical training, with the following given as an example.
>Five minutes to stretch and warm up. >Basic workout of 25 pushups, 35 situps, and 45 jumping jacks over fifteen minutes. >A ten minute, one mile run.
Certainly a modest PT session by military standards, but enough to bring inexperienced civilian volunteers, many of who will be low in determination and quite out of shape, to some degree of physical fitness. After the first two weeks of training, the final half hour of the day should be made a repeat of this regimen.
Teambuilding should be used to infuse good fitness as a goal of the unit. If a volunteer does not want to be in shape, he will not be in shape. Peer pressure and a subtle mix of encouragement and contempt is an effective tool for this purpose.
One of the most important attributes of the New Militia is its self-reliance for technological advantage. The ultimate goal is for the militias to be logistically independent. In practical meaning this means a militia-oriented industry for the production of weapons and war material, and the place this begins is with each militia's organizer.
The military applications of a working knowledge of even college-level chemistry can not be understated. It opens doors to production of explosives, poisons, smoke obscurant systems and rocket propellants. This is probably the most important of the science fields the organizer must master,l as it translates most directly into concrete military benefit to his militia. The place to begin is the nearest university textbook store. Basic texts on chemistry and lab work can be obtained there, and various sources on the net can equip you with a basic chemistry glassware set consisting of (at a minimum) a variety of glass beakers, test tubes, flasks, hotplates, ice baths, and most importantly; a reflux distillation apparatus with condenser. The last piece is critical in creating raw materials for explosives production. Pay especially close attention to educational sections on producing, distilling and mixing acids, nitration reactions, and laboratory safety, especially against static electricity and reaction temperatures. Considerable time should be spent with basic, safe reactions, practicing laboratory safety, and building a stockpile of the more useful and uncommon chemicals and reagents. Avoid at all costs the various "anarchist cookbook" style texts that can be found on the internet - they are a fool's errand of the highest order. See the appendix for useful reactions given as academic examples.
>Physics and Engineering
A basic understanding of level 1 college physics and mechanical engineering can be very useful for determining things like the behavior of flying ballistic projectiles and rockets, or the stress points in a building structure. It is usually not difficult to "sit-in" at a college lecture hall and take notes, even if one is not a student, and the available textbooks are an excellent resource. Pick and choose the most useful examples and study them, but you do not need to be an expert.
Mathematics will be a key requirement for the first two. You must be able to balance chemical equations and perform physics calculations often involving several steps of moderately difficult mathematics. A basic understanding of college algebra and calculus will be most useful, especially in designing and constructing weapons. Again, lectures, textbooks, and homework are the best methods to learn by. You do not require an expert level of knowledge - only a working level tailored to your own necessities.
This is probably the second most important science field to learn after chemistry. A proper working knowledge of electronic circuits opens the door to more advanced military technologies and options. Eavesdropping devices, electronic sabotage, detonator circuits, radio controls - the list is literally endless. The most basic level of understanding can be gained from educational "beginner's kits" from retail chains like Radio Shack, but there will likely be no substitute for a professional one-or-two-semester course taught at your local technical school or university. If nothing else, consider it a way to better yourself and an investment to open job possibilities.
>Fabrication and Welding
A working knowledge of basic building techniques and metal welding is essential in the actual construction of whatever military technology you have envisioned. A grenade launcher that only exists as a blueprint in your mind can not launch a grenade at the enemy - it must be constructed from raw materials, and there is a certain amount of skill required. Basic hobby-level woodworking, pipe fitting, machining, and welding are all the skill required for most projects the militia might require and can easily be gained through a bit of practice on simple "home-improvement" projects, but do not neglect them.
>Vehicles and Transported Military Weapons
A working understanding of the various vehicles fielded by security enforcement and military personnel will be of essential value. You must be able to look at a weapon system, be it a tracked vehicle, wheeled vehicle, helicopter airframe, or portable weapon and immediately understand its purpose. From knowing what it is, and your basic understanding of physics and engineering you can discern its weaknesses. If you know the top road-speed of an enemy's armored transport then you know how long it will take to reinforce a target from its base. If you know the relative strengths and weaknesses of its armor, then you know where to aim your weapons for effect and what weapons to employ. If you recognize a piece of self-propelled artillery, you know its effective range and can then guess at its targets. If you know where the engine air intake is, and how well protected, you can target the engine with chemical weapons to stop the vehicle, and so on and so forth. There are resources available (Jane's Guides being a good one) for the recognition of modern military vehicles and weapons, but do not be deluded into wasting your time studying foreign weapons. See the appendices for more useful information.
>Small Arms and Light Weapons
In the event of actual conflict, it will only be a matter of time before opposition weapons fall into the hands of the militias. You must have a basic working knowledge of the handling, maintenance, and employment of the most common of these weapons in addition to a robust civilian firearms knowledge. An excellent resource exists in the Army's own database of field and technical manuals and the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, available online. The most common of the common are listed:
M16 Rifle, M4 Carbine, M249 Machinegun, M240B Machinegun, M2 .50BMG Machinegun, Mk19 Grenade Launcher, M203 Grenade Launcher, Claymore Mines, US Army Hand Grenades:
AT4 Antitank Rocket Launcher:
1. PREPARING AND FIRING THE AT-4:
a. Select a firing position: Standing, Sitting or Kneeling.
b. (STEPS FOR FIRING AT-4)
(1) Remove launcher from carrying position and cradle it in your left arm.
(2) Remove the transport safety pin.
(3) Place launcher on your right shoulder.
(4) Unsnap shoulder stop and unfold.
(5) Press down and move sight covers to remove sight.
(6) Push cocking lever forward and down.
(7) Check back blast area. 60m danger/30m caution/180 degrees to rear.
(8) Press shoulder stop against shoulder.
(9) Adjust rear sight if target range is more than 200m.
(10) Position eye 2.5 to 3 inches from sight and acquire target. Add lead for moving targets.
(11) Fully depress and hold red safety catch.
(12) Press red trigger button to fire weapon.
Domestic security forces will largely be limited to using conventional civilian weaponry in stock or lightly modified form. Your extensive existing firearm knowledge should be adequate for understanding and employing any you might acquire.
>Combat Field Medicine
Injuries are an aspect of conflict that are all but unavoidable. In addition to the normal hazards of any physical outdoor activity - sprained ankles, broken bones, cuts, scrapes, bruises, dehydration et al., the militant is also in the exhilaratingly unfortunately position of being engaged in a competition with other human beings who are actively trying to kill him. This adds trauma, concussion, overpressure injuries, burn injuries, bullet wounds, and shrapnel punctures to his list of medical concerns among many others.
Medical skills are of vital importance for two reasons. Firstly to the physical well being of the average militiaman - keeping him alive and in one piece by any means necessary. Secondly, by supporting his morale through knowing that even if he is injured he will have support from his colleagues - keeping him fighting.
Militia medical knowledge is split into three levels of care:
>Advanced Combat First Aid
>Civilian Medical Facility Care
>Dedicated Militia Hospital Care
The first is the knowledge the organizer must possess. First aid in combat is significantly different that first aid given in the normal civilian world, but it does share many parallel aspects of knowledge such as basic anatomy, immobilization of fractures, treatment of basic wounds and the like. Institutions and individuals in many parts of the country offer Basic First Aid, Advanced First Aid, and Wilderness First Aid courses, and these should be sought out first to build a basic palette of skills in treating injured human beings. The materials learned in these courses should be subsequently studied to an extensive degree. Even if taken no further, the knowledge gained will be immensely more useful than none at all.
Once the first requirement is met, it should be expanded to cover first aid in combat situations. One of the best general reference guides for this is The Combat Medic Field Reference: ISBN# 0763735639. The book is printed on waterproof paper and spiral bound, and may amount to the militia medic's Bible. One or more hard copies most definitely belong in the organizer's library. Other manuals and guides are available online to supplement it:
>The US Army Ranger Medic Handbook:
>First Aid For Soldiers - The US Army's own combat aid guide
>Where There is No Doctor - A guide to field medicine with primitive materials in harsh locations
>Ditch Medicine - Advanced Field Procedures
>First Aid for Nonlethal Chemical Weapons
-MOFIBA: Mineral Oil Followed Immediately By Alcohol: This treatment is for tear gas or pepper spray on the skin. Soak a 4x4 gauze pad or a clean dry cloth with mineral oil. Thoroughly rub the exposed skin with the mineral oil, but avoid contact with the eyes. Once this is done, quickly soak another 4x4 pad with rubbing alcohol and vigourously remove the mineral oil, again avoiding the eyes. Complete the procedure as many times as needed to ensure total decontamination. You can also use cold water if you don't have MOFIBA. Make sure it's cold water, because warm or hot water can open your pours and allow the chemicals to seep deeper into your skin.
-LAW: Liquid Antacid and Water: This treatment is for chemicals in the eyes and mouth. The suggested formula for this mixture is 50 percent liquid antacid (i.e. Maalox) and 50 percent water, mixed and stored in a squirt bottle. The eyes should be flushed with water first, followed by the LAW mixture. Flush from the inside of the eye towards the outside, with the head tilted back slightly and towards the side being flushed. The victim may have trouble getting the eye open because of the pain, but the liquid must get into the eye in order for the treatment to work. Try to reassure the victim the irritation is temporary and help is on the way. Remember that rubbing the eyes will do more harm than good. Try to blink the chemical out by letting your natural tear ducts do some of the work. The LAW mixture is also good for cleansing the mouth of pepper spray and tear gas. Simply swish or gargle the LAW liquid inside your mouth and spit. Do not swallow. You may want to rinse your mouth out with straight water afterwards.
>The Medical Bag
Volumes have been written on the assembly of a proper medical field bag for combat first aid. It is likely best to go with a preassembled kit and then make a few modifications to it. An excellent example can be found as:
The addition of a few Israeli Bandages, tampons and maxipads (for puncture and bullet wounds) would make an excellent basic medic's kit.
>Civilian Hospital Care
For more advanced injury care, it may become necessary to utilize the existing civilian medical infrastructure of the area of operations. This is risky, because civilian medical facilities are required under threat of law to report bullet wounds and "suspicious" injuries to the oppositional authorities.
There are three potential approaches to the situation requiring civilian medical care:
2: Secure, Hold, Remove
3: Commit and Resist
>Deception The unit involved completes the casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and, upon realizing he will require treatment at a civilian facility, transits themselves and the casualty into civilian clothes. The casualty is transported to either the nearest militia-friendly medical facility, or to a facility as far from the location of the fighting as reasonably possible given the degree of the injury. The casualty is relinquished to the civilian hospital under a suitable cover story - such as being a bystander who was injured by crossfire. It is likely that he will be tested for "gun shot residue" to confirm this story at some point, so his hands, lower arms, and face (near the ejection port of his rifle) should be thoroughly washed with soap and water and rinsed several times en-route to the facility, and he should not be allowed to come in contact with his contaminated outer clothing once they have been removed. Anyone who handles him during and after the washing should themselves wash their hands before touching him, as to avoid transferring their own gun shot residue to him. His identification should be concealed by hiding any ID or documents he has with him and securing them. With the opposition then none the wiser, the casualty will be treated at the civilian medical facility like any ordinary person.
>Secure, Hold, Remove If there is a large number of casualties and the deception plan has failed, or the men of the CASEVAC unit have good reason to believe that it will, and the manpower and weapons are available, the militia may opt to seize control of a civilian facility to acquire treatment of the wounded. The hospital building and surrounding area should be secured by armed militiamen and roadblock checkpoints improvised. Multiple escape routes should be established and pre-prepared, with transport vehicles at the ready. The facility must be held until all the casualties have been stabilized to such an extent that they can be safely transported to militia-held medical facilities in safer areas, or until the safe AO can be expanded around the hospital itself, incorporating it as a strongpoint.
>Commit and Resist In the third mode, the militia faces a hopeless situation. With one or more critical casualties on hand, and no hope of deceiving or co-opting the hostile civilian hospital, the casualties are transported there with full knowledge of their eventual capture, interrogation, and imprisonment. They should be stripped of all ID and sensitive materials and washed to remove gun shot residue, and turned over to the hospital's emergency personnel. The CASEVAC team then immediately retreats. Their fallen comrade is alive, and with lack of gun shot residue and perhaps his own wits, must commit his own personal resistance and deception skills against his captors, and if at all possible, to escape when he has sufficiently recovered.
>Dedicated Militia Hospital Care
As the conflict escalates, it is reasonable to assume that the Movement itself will begin to take a quantity of trained medical professionals into its ranks. Hospitals in secure AOs can be co-opted to provide dedicated care for militiamen, and sympathetic doctors employed to establish separate field hospitals exclusively for the militia, staffed by volunteers. Supplies for these hospitals should be purchased whenever possible, and operationally commandeered from facilities in hostile areas when not. Due to their secure nature, such field hospitals are the most ideal place for treating combat casualties and should remain the preferred option whenever possible.
The organizer must be able to collect and process information and intelligence related to militia-relevant subjects in his area of operations, and teach this skill to others.
Intelligence is divided into three classifications.
>Human Intelligence The most basic form of intelligence gathering - the person to person conversation. This requires little more than conversational skills, a keen ear for details, and a good memory. Talk to people who are in positions to know things that might be of interest to you, and let them fill in the details during casual conversation of the topic. When dealing with contacts in the community and sensitive information, trust your sources but verify what they have told you before considering it actionable. Be sincere, be normal, and utilize your personality and speaking skills.
Information gleaned this way should be written down as soon as possible after the conversation, and should include the date and time of the conversation and the name of the contact. Notable points of information to look for are:
-Sensitive political or military information.
-Who does the contact know? Record names, jobs, etc. of anyone mentioned by them.
-Record their personal details. Did they mention their job or past jobs? The school they attended? Their neighborhood? Their birth date? Are they married (wedding ring) and if so to whom? Are they prior service? Have they ever been employed by the government?
-Record their vehicle make and model and license plate number, state, and county.
-Are they seen in the company of other people? Record the names and as much information as possible about their associations.
-Anything else about them that stands out. A favorite store to shop in, always seen wearing a certain brand of clothing or boots? Pay attention to detail.
The information thus gathered FROM ALL CONTACTS should be recorded into a single large computer text file. The purpose for this is to allow a simple "Ctrl-F" search for a term to cross-reference your contacts and reveal useful information.
By knowing who knows who and what, and knowing the personal information of the parties involved, you can leverage your personality within their social networks for maximum gain. Simultaneously, having contacts whose information is found obviously false or contradictory (Jack is interested in the Movement and claims to have gone to School A, but a quick search shows that last year you recorded that Jill went to School A [you've since seen her yearbook as proof and noted this] that year and upon asking her says she has never heard of Jack) can lead you to potential provocateurs or other attempted infiltrators.
SIGINT for the Militia is not as sophisticated as what the regular military will engage in. The costs for the necessary hardware and the futility of breaking modern military encrypted communications provide an almost impassable obstacle for the civilian technology available to the Movement.
However, there remains the information available through eavesdropping on the communications of domestic security enforcement personnel. With a modest investment in communications technology, specifically a Digital Trunking Radio Scanner, you can eavesdrop on the communications of police departments, security agencies, fire departments and similar outlets provided they are not using active encryption which few presently do.
Information to record includes numbers and types of units responding to various calls, the meanings of police radio codes in your AO, police and fire department reaction times, the frequency and circumstances of SWAT calls, and the use of special vehicles like armored cars or other speciality equipment.
Any interesting cases coming over the radio should be cross referenced with your HUMINT text file. Are the persons involved anyone you know? Was a domestic disturbance call just sent out for the address of John and Jane whom you know? Update their files with details from the radio.
As part of SIGINT, the organizer should avail himself of a general education in communications and radio technology. Meeting the requirements for a HAM-radio Technician Class license is an excellent place to start, and the Advanced Class requirements are better still. Self-contained communications will be an important component of the Movement as a whole as well as individual Militias who must have team communication in the field. Solutions for secure communication will be posited further in this work.
PUBINT is simply the aggregation of useful, publicly available intelligence from open sources in electronic or printed media.
It requires, much like HUMINT, a keen eye for detail, a good memory, and an always-handy notepad and pen. Good sources of information are local television news, blogs hosted by local personalities, militia friendly websites who specialize in cataloguing related news articles, and Fox News in particular.
Fox News is singled out because of its "right wing" political nature. This nature leads it to provide unusually intense focus on the actions of the Military and domestic security forces, and so better detailed information can be obtained through them then via other competing networks. This fact has been exploited successfully by opposition forces in the Mid-East wars already and has proven itself useful.
Various public websites can be used for this purpose as well. For example:
If you can obtain, for example, the full name of a soldier via personal contacts or resources like Facebook, you can locate him and his unit by mailing a written request to:
>Commander, U.S. Army Enlisted Records & Evaluation Center, ATTN: Locator, Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN 46249-5301
Google is your friend, but use it wisely and follow Computer Security (COMPUSEC) protocols when utilizing the search engine.
PUBINT includes other general information resources as well. Blueprints to building can be obtained for a small fee from the City Hall where the building is located. Street Maps and even Satellite Imagery can be downloaded and printed off the Internet from Google Maps. The US Topological Survey provides robust listings of topological and terrain contour maps in digital format free of charge.
Facebook is the pinnacle of social engineering tools, and can open doors into other individuals lives in unprecedented ways. It might take a team of intelligence agents and a budget in the tens of thousands of dollars, six months to extract the same amount of intelligence on a person's private life that they post on Facebook every week.
Even Wikipedia can be useful for gathering PUBINT. It can detail the histories of target entities, their land holdings and headquarters buildings. Or list enough personal information about relevant individuals to ascertain their whereabouts.
The possibilities are myriad.
Intelligence gathering of any type is a complicated business, because you need to build a way to keep all the collected information sorted, related, and documented. For every grain of wheat there is a bushel of chaff to dig through. And that is before you start considering the possibilities of oppositional Counter-Intelligence at play. Nevertheless, intelligence gathering is a critical skill, and will likely occupy a significant amount of your future militia's time, energy and patience.
Remember to verify. A piece of intelligence that is unsubstantiated is a rumor. The higher-value the intelligence and the more related to you it is, the more it should be considered suspect.
>If one source provides key intel, it is a possibility. If two independent sources have confirmed the same intel, it is a probability. If three or more independent sources have confirmed the same intel, it is ACTIONABLE. Always know the truth of what is going on - NEVER assume or rush to judgement.
>Bylaws, Counterintelligence, and the Militia of One
This is a section that has pained me greatly in writing. Looking at the abject intelligence failure that is the existing militia movement, I was struck with a problem that seemed to be almost insurmountable. Nearly every militia that has been persecuted or prosecuted has fallen to a very simple, creative strategy used by the primary opposition. It is a strategy that works against the individual militia and its preparations to an even better degree based on the level of public activity of the militia. It is a strategy that works to apprehend both criminal gangs masquerading as militias as well as for the entrapment of legitimate defenders of the Constitutional ideology. That strategy is infiltration, and it seemed to me for the longest time that no practical solution to this vulnerability could be had if the idealized New Militia were to be a truly public and accountable organization.
The typical modus operandi of the opposition is to use paid informants, and occasionally employed agents, to pose as prospective militia members. They rarely spare any expense in social engineering to ingratiate their mole into the organization, even to the point of falsifying job records or entire backgrounds, paying for the mole's housing and living expenses, and through him making money and matériel contributions to the militia or even personal contributions to its members. Once the mole is suitably trusted, the typical assault tactic employed is to leverage the egos of the highest ranking militia members while simultaneously goading them into undertaking some illegal action. During these sessions, the mole will usually be found recording the conversation taking place, which will be used against the militia as evidence even though it is often the mole who is doing the criminal instigating. The final "attack" phase used by the mole in order to close the doors of his trap is typically designed to lead to one or both of two possible charges:
Illegal possession of matériel
>Illegal possession of matériel
This is the most common mode of prosecution for a militia in the present movement. In summary, it consists of the trusted mole either offering up some piece or pieces of restricted matériel, or putting the militia in touch with another agent of the opposition who will pose as such a supplier. The type of items that may be offered will almost always be of some useful military value and will be otherwise illegal to possess. Examples from past criminal cases show items like explosives, detonators, grenades, components for bombs or explosives, shoulder launched missiles, incendiary weapons like molotov cocktails, night vision goggles, fully automatic weapons or parts or training to convert legal weapons to fully automatic, and obviously stolen military hardware like GPS units or military radios are the preferred choices. Like any classic criminal "sting" operation, the unwary militiamen are lured into accepting possession of such items and then are shortly arrested.
This method of entrapment is used less frequently only because it has proven somewhat less successful in the courtroom, and because the social engineering aspect is more complicated from the mole's point of view. For a charge of conspiracy to "stick", the mole must collect substantial evidence of the militia members making clear and specific threats of some criminal activity which they can actually be proven to have the means to carry out. The mission of the mole, therefore, is to be a violent voice of instigation within the militia. He will call for or otherwise passively encourage some drastic and illegal action to be taken, or coax members who already have violent inclinations to be vocal about their potential future actions in a conspiratorial way. Because militias are preparatory in nature, he will exploit the temptation to have "plans on hand" in case of some future violent military confrontation, and the court makes no distinction between preparation for offensive military conduct and preparation for criminal violence. Once the militia begins to vocally consider specific "scenarios" and to establish "targets" or accomplish some other preparatory step, the mole and his audio recorder have all the evidence required for arrests and criminal charges. It must also be remembered that it is not only the members of the militia doing the talking who will face persecution - anyone present or aware of such discussions who has not reported them to authorities will be charged as accessories. Active participation is not a requirement to be prosecution under either of the two methods listed here.
Neither of these infiltration strategies would be difficult for the militia to defeat, if it were not for the fact that they exploit two of the militia's very purposes against it. The physical capability and material and tactical preparations for combat are two of the militia's overarching goals. Both tread a very fine line of legality, and it is extremely easy for an infiltrator to sway a militia across that line just an inch, or to turn on the militia at the moment it needs to expand its capabilities. Furthermore, if the militia is open to the public, it is extremely difficult to prevent that initial infiltration and simply exclude the mole. The mole could be anyone, even one of the militia's founders.
There is one approach, and it is possibly the only approach, that can prevent such prosecutions against the militia. It is designed to render the mole powerless despite his presence in the militia and his awareness of its activities. It is a doctrine that controls and coordinates elements of member selection, initial formation of the militia, access to militia information, operational security, data security, and the very charter and bylaws under which the militia it organized.
This doctrine is called "Militia of One."
>A Militia of One
On its face, the doctrine can be simply described as incorporating five factors:
-A set of bylaws for the militia that divides militia group activity from personal activity and forbids intermingling of these.
-Initial formation of the militia officer corps and Civil Power from local, known citizens only.
-A two-tiered approach for information security.
-Background checks, both criminal and informal, conducted on all recruited members depending upon their level of access.
The goal of the doctrine is to minimize the amount of damage that a mole could possibly create. Each of the five factors contributes something toward this goal.
>A set of bylaws for the militia that divides militia group activity from personal activity and forbids intermingling of these.
This is the key factor of the doctrine, the others existing to support it. Put simply, the rules of the militia must explicitly forbid under punishment of immediate and irrevocable expulsion, any discussion or solicitation of discussion among or between members at any time and at any place, of any sort of offensive planning, matériel procurement, illegal weaponry, or any other illegal activity. Simultaneously, however, the militia should encourage members as individuals to research and develop expanded military and tactical knowledge and capabilities on their own and in private. General knowledge, such as electronics and chemistry, shooting skills, combat drills, combat medicine and such, can be practiced in public using completely benign examples to build overall skills. The organizer will keep a list of what members specialize in what benign skill fields [Bob and Joe both have a knack for electronics, but Jim is the best long range shooter], but nothing more specific than that.
What this does is limit the knowledge of potentially prosecutable activities only to the individual member undertaking them. If no matériel changes hands, and no discussion has taken place, both potential criminal charges are null and void. The mole can come to every meeting, and record every word spoken. He will find no evidence of wrongdoing regardless of how many members might actually be operating outside the law. No one will know any member's capabilities except that member himself, not even the organizer. The only way a mole could collect evidence would be to encourage a member or members to break this rule, instantly outing himself as a mole and commanding his expulsion under the bylaws. This factor also works against active members who have been "turned" by the opposition. They have no evidence, and can collect no evidence, of any "extrajudicial activity" except his own. This allows the militia members to build skillsets and military knowledge that can be finally called upon in actual conflict, but without pooling it in such a way as to make themselves targets beforehand.
>Initial formation of the militia officer corps, Public Relations, and Civil Power Wings from local, known citizens only.
This factor is exactly what it says on the tin. The initial formation of the militia - The PR and Civil Power wings, and later the Militia Officer Corps should be chosen by the organizer from people in his local community. By excluding "outsiders" he can be assured that there are no moles implanted in this initial "seedling" build of the militia. It is far less likely that the man who has lived a block away from you for the last six years is an opposition spy than the man who just moved into town and REALLY wants to join your militia. The latter may occupy a lower echelon spot when manpower is called for, but should certainly not be part of the founding. The organizer should carefully choose who to invite to form the militia based upon their personalities, political beliefs, and good character. He will use a "fifth column" mechanism to gather potential members to choose from under guise of a different but related activity, and this mechanic will be described later in the work.
>A two-tiered approach for information security.
There should be two tiers of operation security within the militia, and these tiers should be enforced. The first, "Primary" tier is that of the organizer himself, the Civil Power committee, and select members of the Public Relations Wing and Militia Officer Corps who have been granted clearances. The second "Reserve" tier incorporates most of the PR wing, non-original Militia Officers, and the entire body of enlisted militiamen (as would be formed in actual conflict) and members of the general public.
All sensitive information such as finances, contact lists, equipment suppliers, member lists and contact information, training and contingency plans, rendezvous locations, staging areas, member performance and skills, potential targets (benignly labeled) and gathered intelligence are restricted to the Primary level. Mundane, day to day information concerning public works, political projects, members numbers and such are available to everyone at the Reserve level.
This insures that important, militia-centric, non-incriminating information is available to the members of the decisionmaking body. While preventing potential moles, who are more likely to be newer members, from accessing sensitive data about the militia's internal operations and planning.
>Background checks, both criminal and informal, conducted on all recruited members depending upon their level of access.
Ideally, those in the Reserve category should never be made aware that a higher level exists. Admission should be invite only by group decision of the Civil Power, and only after an extensive background check. The check should include both a check of the potential member's criminal record as well as an informal check of his stated background and finances, and possibly even a lie detector test.
Background checks are an essential component of the New Militia's recruiting strategy. Criminal elements within the ranks are damaging to the Movement for three reasons: They harm the movement's reputation if they are exposed. They may continue their criminal inclinations from within the movement, resulting in harm. And they are, by virtue of being known to the authorities, much more susceptible to being turned into moles.
All members should face at least a basic criminal background check. Fortunately this is not difficult to accomplish. Possessing a valid Concealed Carry Permit is sufficient evidence in most states of a clean criminal record. Otherwise the simplest way is to have the member pawn a firearm at a local pawn shop and pick it up again the next day with another militia member present as a witness. This will cost only a few dollars, and he may request a copy of the approved Form 4473 as proof that he passed the check.
For admittance into the Primary security clearance level, a rigorous background check should be conducted. Not only should a new criminal records check be ran, but the member should be asked to submit a complete "on-the-spot" profile of himself listing past addresses, past jobs, school history, and financial information such as audits, tax problems, or bankruptcies. The reason for conducting the profile on the spot is to deny him time to come up with any convincing deceptions, as he will not likely have any prepared beforehand even if he is a mole. This information should be actively verified by calling his schools and former workplaces and confirming his profile as quickly as possible after the profile is taken.
For the highest security operations, like a position in the Officer Corp for handling tactical planning, or for the Militia's treasurer, a simple lie detector test may be prudent. This doesn't have to be a complicated affair, and modern technology can allow any computer with a good quality microphone to perform one via Voice Stress Analysis. Free software is available for conducting such tests, and there are even basic applications for Android phones and iPhones that use the NATO standard of voice stress recognition to detect lies. Before considering that this seems like too much work, consider that many Motorcycle Clubs in the US go to exactly such measures to avoid infiltration, and have met with great success. The questions asked should be simple, and techniques for questioning abound. An example is listed below for convenience.
>What is your name? John Smith
>What is your birthdate? mm/dd/yyyy
>Who do you work for? Joebob's Plumbing Supply
>You have worked there for six years, true or false? False. Five years.
>You have committed crimes in the past. True or False? False.
>You are in financial trouble right now, aren't you? No.
>You are loyal to the Militia? Yes.
>But are you MORE loyal to the opposition? No.
And so forth.
Only if a member's profile checks out to a great degree, he has not overtly failed the lie detector test [they are not perfectly accurate and only indicate trends. Only OBVIOUS failure should count against the member], and has not had any substantial financial problems should his clearance be granted.
>In final summary, the goal of this doctrine is to exploit the "Indiana Jones" principle of planning against the spies of the opposition. If the militia's left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing vis-a-vis potentially prosecutable capabilities, then neither can the enemy. In the event of actual military conflict, and genuine activation of the Militia wing itself, the Civil Power wing can then call on all members to present and provide the knowledge and skills they have acquired, and then choose how best to make use of them. Even if there is a mole present at that time, the Militia will be under a state of combat mobilization, and thus the mole will not be given the time or opportunity to provide that intelligence to his masters. Even then, the opposition will no longer have any legal authority and any attempt at meeting the Militia with force should be responded to with force. Once the war is on, all bets are already off.
>On Gathering the Hordes, Community Building, and the Armed Neighborhood Watch
One of the most difficult elements of creating a militia under the auspice of the New Movement is the gathering of a suitable audience from which to draw potential recruits.
America is a relatively fractured country these days. Where once it was only normal and proper for neighbors to watch out for eachother, to know eachother, to know who did and did not "belong" in a neighborhood, now there is much suspicion and introversion between ordinary people. This is the first barrier preventing the militia Organizer from forming his initial group. To invite people you know well who live near you, you have to know the people who live near you well. By following that guideline, you can reduce and eliminate the possibility of infiltration into the initial core of your militia. The question is how to accomplish it.
In following lessons learned by the "community organizers" of the liberal movement, it becomes clear that in order for a neighborhood to organize a catalyst is required. The role of the militia Organizer is to seek out, discover, isolate, and capitalize on an opportunity to create that catalyst within his or her own neighborhood. One which accomplishes the dual purpose of connecting the members of the public and introducing the concept of self defense and the communal taking up of arms is ideally suited to the Organizer's goal. That catalyst is crime and the current state of political unease. The ideal organizing structure born of that catalyst is the Armed Neighborhood Watch.
Whatever factors within the public mind that draw people to the idea of the Militia also resonate generally with the idea of self defense. The ANW concept is one that draws on this natural instinct of the FYS personality. The community that is disillusioned with their local protection, or finds it wanting in the face of local crime is a fertile ground for the militia Organizer. Even if the crime rates of the country overall are on a decline, which they are as of the time of this writing, there will still be examples of local crimes that can be exploited to summon the support of the public. The very same emotional factors that are used by the opposition to create grassroots support for gun control and other such initiatives can also be exploited by the New Movement. People with even a hint of the militant mindset tend to be an above-average level of individualistic, and the idea of creating an approving public apparatus by which they take their own safety and that of their community into their own hands can be appealing.
The creation of a neighborhood watch, armed or otherwise, is also an excellent exercise in the general principles of community organizing. So how to begin?
The first step is to create a message, apply supporting information to that message, and then get that message out. The mechanics of this couldn't be simpler - if you have a computer, a printer, and a little time you have all the tools required.
As a working example of the process, the Organizer creates a single-page flier including the following elements.
>A statement of the problems and recent local crimes committed in the neighborhood. >A call to action, for the people to take responsibility and discuss the issue. >An invitation to a local location central to the neighborhood and open to the public, perhaps the Organizers own yard. >A call for everyone in the neighborhood to meet there on a certain convenient date and time and discuss the idea of an Armed Neighborhood Watch.
The message is easy to distribute. A single evening spent walking around the neighborhood and dropping a copy of the flier into each mailbox. Once the bait has been set, the organizer waits. Three or four days before the appropriate date, the organizer repeats his walk and places reminder fliers into the same mailboxes. The repetition demonstrates to the people that the offer is a serious one and can increase turnout.
All that remains is to prepare the location and receive the crowd.
At the meeting itself, the Organizer should remember that although he is doing it to serve his overall goal, the formation of such a neighborhood watch is a serious matter, and something worthy of accomplishing in its own right. He must be capable of arguing persuasively, and in success actually manifesting the organization he seeks from the people before him. Such a concept for an ANW is simple - members of the community who wish to participate must acquire some form of weapon - even rudimentary pepper spray would suffice, and agree to set schedules to patrol the neighborhood. Contact information should be gathered, each person's house and home number plotted on a map copy for easy reference, and telephone or text trees set up to warn neighbors of a threat even before calling police. A regular meeting should be scheduled as a social event, perhaps monthly, for the community members to meet, greet, speak, and share ideas.
From closeness comes trust. From trust comes protection. From protection in practice comes organization, and from organization comes the roots of the New Militia Movement. The subtle inroads cleared by such an event can be expanded into the core of a Militia far more easily, safely, and reliably than the old ad-hoc "good old boys" groups of the past.